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PREFACE 
T H E V O L T A R E S E T T L E M E N T S Y M P O S I U M was held at the 
University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, from March 
21 to 27, 1965. It was sponsored jointly by the Volta River 
Authority and the Faculty of Architecture of the University. 
The convening committee consisted of Dr D. A. P. Butcher, 
Research Fellow in Sociology in the Research Department of 
the Faculty of Architecture; Mr E. A. K . Kalitsi, Resettlement 
Officer of the Volta River Authority; Professor J. R. Lloyd, 
Dean of the Faculty of Architecture; and Mr H. F. Winful, 
Executive Secretary of the Volta River Authority. The detailed 
organisation at Kumasi was undertaken by the Research 
Department of the Faculty of Architecture, and travel arrange-
ments for participants were made by the Volta River Authority. 
The Symposium was attended by over 150 people from at least 
seven countries, and thirteen papers were presented, most of 
them by authors who had been directly involved in the resettle-
ment operation. These papers were mimeographed in an un-
edited form and reissued as "Volta Resettlement Symposium 
Papers" in June 1965. Demand for them soon outstripped supply, 
and this led to a series of initiatives by the Volta River Authority 
to secure editing and more permanent publication. This has 
eventually been made possible through support from the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, acting 
through the Volta Lake Research Project. 
In selecting, editing and shortening the papers I have been 
given a free hand. For this I am indebted to Mr E. L. Quartey, 
the Chief Executive of the Volta River Authority, who invited 
me to carry out the task, and to the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, who approved 
the arrangements. I have tried to concentrate attention on the 
practical experience of the resettlement programme. I also 
felt that, if there were major revisions based on events sub-
sequent to March 1965, some of the freshness and immediacy 
of the papers would be lost. I therefore asked the contributors 
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to exercise forbearance and to allow the substance of what they 
had written to stand, regardless of what had happened since. 
I should like to thank them all most warmly for accepting this 
approach, agreeing to almost all editorial revisions, and com-
municating promptly as we have proceeded. Few editors can 
have had such co-operative and efficient contributors. Delays 
have been partly my responsibility, and I owe all concerned 
an apology that the final work of editing was not completed 
earlier. 
In writing the last chapter I have had the benefit of hindsight 
denied to the contributors. To have edited the papers without 
bringing events up to date and trying to analyse some of the 
major issues raised by the experience would, I think, have been 
to shirk a proper responsibility. At the same time, I have been 
pulled in one direction by the temptation to make easy criticisms 
based on the obvious problems that have arisen, and in the 
opposite direction by a sense of awe at the difficulties of the 
resettlement operation and the boldness and imagination with 
which they were tackled. I cannot expect that the resulting 
interpretation is balanced; I can only say that I have tried to 
make it so. 
The first and last chapters differ from the rest in having 
been written by someone who was an outsider to the resettle-
ment programme and who knew little of Ghana. It has been 
possible to write them only because of the generous help, 
support and criticism of many people. Sir Robert Jackson was 
responsible for the suggestion that I should go to Ghana in 1965 
and has throughout put his weight behind proposals for 
publication. Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie has consistently 
encouraged me and allowed me time for fieldwork and writing. 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
enabled me to visit Ghana and to carry out other tasks in 
connection with this book. During my two main periods in 
Ghana, in 1965 and 1968, I was given great assistance by the 
Volta River Authority; and, through reading files, interviewing 
staff and visiting resettlement towns, I was able to investigate 
the past and present of the resettlement programme. Those 
who helped me are too numerous to name, but I hope they 
will accept my thanks nonetheless. I must, however, mention 
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my particular debts to Mr E. A. K . Kalitsi and Mr G. W. 
Amarteifio for giving up much of their time to long and frank 
interviews and for making information freely available; to Dr 
D. A. P. Butcher for sharing with me his insights and research 
findings; to Dr B. W. Taylor, Manager of the Volta Lake 
Research Project, for his guidance; and to Mr Kwame Frempah 
and Mr R. W. Amarteifio for making my visits to the resettle-
ment towns as useful and enjoyable as they were. 
Detailed comments on earlier versions of the first and last 
chapters have been made by Mr G. W. Amarteifio, Dr D. A. P. 
Butcher, Mr C. A. Dadey, Professor Miles Danby, Mr Laszlo 
Huszar, Sir Robert Jackson, Mr E. A. K. Kalitsi, Mrs Rowena 
Lawson, Mr D. Paul Lumsden, Mr A. E. G. Markham, Mr 
R. J. Moxon, Mr Emmanuel Muttukumaru, Mr K. A. Sagoe 
and Dr B. W. Taylor. As a result I have been able to correct 
many errors of fact and interpretation. The opinions expressed 
are, however, mine, and responsibility for them and for mistakes 
which remain rests with me. Equally, it must be stated on behalf 
of the contributors that they have written in private capacities 
and the opinions expressed are their own individually and do 
not represent those of any organisations for which they have 
worked. 
Throughout the process of producing this book I have been 
fortunate in being able to benefit from the experience and 
advice of Mr Ross Pye of the Pall Mall Press. I should like to 
thank him particularly for his patience, his guidance on many 
points and the considerable detailed work in which he has been 
involved in preparing this book for publication. Many other 
people have also made contributions. The bibliography is the 
result of suggestions from many sources, but I should like 
especially to thank Mr Leo Barrington and the Librarian of 
the Volta River Authority, Mr T. W. Cochrane, for their help. 
The photographs have been provided by Mr G. W. Amarteifio 
(Nos 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), Mr W. E. Bell (Nos i , 2 and 14), Dr 
D. A. P. Butcher (No 15), Ghana Information Services (Nos 
9 and 19), and the Volta River Authority Public Relations 
Unit (Nos 10, 11, 18, 21, 23, 27 and 28). The rest of the photos 
(Nos 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29 and 30) were taken 
by me. The maps have been drawn variously by Mr A. I. S. 
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Conochie, Mr A. G. Kelly, Mrs E. Mowberry and Mr G. K . 
Woassey. To Mrs Ljerka Krasevic, who typed most of the 
text, I am indebted for her prompt and very skilful work, 
without which my task as editor would have been much more 
difficult. 
Finally, I must state the purpose behind this book. This is 
not, and has never been conceived as, a public relations exercise 
on the part of the Volta River Authority. The intention has 
been to present the experience gained on the Volta so that it 
may be of use to others. On his appointment in May 1962, 
faced with an intimidating task and little time, the Resettlement 
Officer went to the library of the University of Ghana to see 
what had been written about approaches to the problem of 
resettlement. No books on the subject were available. I am 
sure that all who have contributed to this book and who have 
made its publication possible hope that such a situation will 
not recur and that others confronted with similar problems 
will find something of value in the experience presented here. 
Robert Chambers 
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Introduction 
R O B E R T C H A M B E R S 
T H E P R I M E reason for constructing the Volta dam was to 
provide cheap hydro-electric power, both for an aluminium 
smelter to exploit Ghana's large bauxite deposits and for other 
industrial use, to reduce the country's overdependence on 
cocoa. The history of the main dam and power project is 
worthy of study and can be found described elsewhere,1 but 
the programme to resettle the people displaced by the lake 
formed by the dam has attracted at least as much attention. 
The exceptional scale and difficulty of the resettlement opera-
tion, the new methods devised, the permissive and peaceful 
evacuation, the new resettlement towns and the rehabilitation 
and development programmes for the period after evacuation 
have all aroused widespread interest. This introduction is an 
attempt to outline the background to the operation, to examine 
some of the main problems and constraints which had to be 
faced, and to show how these influenced the evolution of 
resettlement policies. 
The formidable physical difficulties of the operation can be 
understood from the nature of the basin that was to be flooded. 
The dam was to be sited near the head of the narrow gorge 
where the Volta river cuts through the Togo and Akwapim 
ranges, impounding water from a catchment of 150,000 square 
miles. The lake to be formed would spread out over the 
shallow Volta basin to become in area the largest man-made 
reservoir in the world, covering 3,275 square miles, half the 
size of Wales or New Jersey, a thirtieth of the surface of Ghana. 
Not only was the lake basin vast, it was also unhealthy. Insect-
borne diseases were endemic, with malaria and river-blindness 
affecting people, and trypanosomiasis affecting cattle. Much 
Note: References for this chapter wil l be found on pages 3 1 - 3 . 
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of the basin was also not easy to reach, with difficult terrain 
and vegetation and with communications that were very poor 
by national standards. Although the Volta river had in the 
past carried trade in slaves, salt and other goods, it was broken 
by rapids and had not developed into a major modern com-
mercial artery. Few roads penetrated the thick tropical rain 
forests which covered the hills of the south and east, and there 
were only a few motorable tracks in the savannah woodland 
of the north. The basin was in the heart of Ghana; but, with 
the exception of the main road to Kete Krachi (anyway to be 
cut by the lake), it was isolated, and skirted by the principal 
lines of communication. 
The problems of resettlement were further aggravated by the 
character and distribution of the people living within the flood 
basin. There was considerable uncertainty until a late stage 
about how large the population was; and although the number 
eventually identified, some 80,000, was only a little more than 
one per cent of the population of Ghana, giving a population 
density much lower than the national average, these people 
were widely scattered in small communities. Of some 740 
groups, there was only one town (Kete Krachi) of over 4,000 
persons, while 600 groups had populations of less than 100. 
There was unusual ethnic and linguistic diversity. Akwamu, 
Ewe, Gonja, Krachi, Krobo and Kwahu people were among 
the most common, but there were also others, including 
immigrants from Nigeria and Togo. In one small area alone, 
Akwamu East, it was found that eight languages were spoken.2 
Moreover, the people were generally poorer and were less 
well-educated than was usual in Ghana. The Krobo cocoa-
farmers in the south were exceptional in their relative prosperity, 
but most of the other inhabitants of the flood basin practised 
shifting cultivation to achieve little more than subsistence.3 
Special policy dilemmas were posed by Tongu fishermen*4 and 
* T o n g u fishermen originated from their 'homes' on the lower reaches of the 
V o l t a , b u t h a d been settling in the lake basin since at least the last decade 
o f the nineteenth century, a n d settlement was continuing. A l t h o u g h they often 
migrated in the course of their fishing, sent their dead ' h o m e ' for burial , a n d usually 
returned ' h o m e ' for a n n u a l festivals, m a n y spent most of the year on the river a n d 
h a d established themselves permanently there, and some had even become full-
time farmers. 
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Konkomba yam-farmers who had settled in the basin but who 
often retained other homes and interests elsewhere. From a policy 
point of view, problems like these were complicated by lack of 
information. Because of the poor communications and the wide 
scatter of small villages and hamlets, little was known of the 
people living in the basin, and some were so well hidden that they 
had never paid tax or been counted in censuses. As a result, the 
Volta compensation and resettlement operation had to begin by 
looking for the people and finding out more about them. 
In the early 1960s, once it was definitely known that the dam 
was to be built, the Ghana government was faced with the 
immediate and intimidating tasks of identifying, compensating 
and resettling the people who were to be displaced by the lake. 
Before independence in 1957, the proposals for resettlement 
had been similar to those for the Kariba dam: self-help resettle-
ment by the people themselves, with limited government 
assistance and without any major economic change. Later, this 
policy was transformed into proposals similar to the Aswan 
resettlement programmes, for the provision of houses, the 
collection of communities into larger units, and the establish-
ment of a higher standard of living through modern and 
mechanised agriculture. This introduction describes the 
original proposals, the precedents, pressures and delays which 
came to bear on them, and the new policy which emerged. In 
the papers which follow, some of the main actors describe the 
experience and lessons up to March 1965 of many of the 
activities—organisation, valuation, social survey, social wel-
fare, planning, house design, land clearing, road building, 
house construction, evacuation, town administration and 
agricultural development among others—which they carried 
out in order to implement the programme. Finally, the events 
from March 1965 to mid-1968 are summarised, and some 
further practical issues discussed. 
T H E P R E P A R A T O R Y C O M M I S S I O N P O L I C Y : 
S E L F - H E L P W I T H I N C E N T I V E S 
From the beginning, compensation and resettlement were re-
garded as closely-related matters and the proper concern and 
12 
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responsibility of the government. The consultants who sub-
mitted plans for the Volta River Project in 1951 estimated £2 
million as the cost of compensation and resettlement for the 
2,000 square miles which, at that time, it was thought would 
be flooded.5 In its official response in 1952, the government 
accepted responsibility, stating that it wished 'to assure in-
habitants of the areas to be submerged that when the time 
comes, every person who is displaced or will lose his house, or 
farms, or any other property will be suitably compensated'.6 
Of greater significance in its long-term implications was the 
much publicised and often quoted statement made in 1953 by 
Kwame Nkrumah, then Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, 
that, if the project was carried out, the government would 
ensure that no one was made worse off as a result of the creation 
of the lake.7 
In 1953, a Preparatory Commission under Commander 
(now Sir) Robert Jackson began preliminary investigations for 
the Volta River Project. Although much of the attention of the 
Commission was directed towards the dam and the smelter, 
extensive preliminary surveys were undertaken in the flood 
basin. These included counts of population in almost all the 
larger villages, surveys of cocoa and oil palms, sample counts 
of other perennial crops, a valuation of land including its 
farming potential, and a survey of the public and private 
buildings that would be inundated.8 An impressive amount 
of data was collected, and, in its Report presented at the end 
of 1955, the Commission was able to recommend a com-
prehensive set of proposals for compensation and resettlement. 
The Commission regarded compensation as a legal obligation 
and advocated the outright acquisition of valuable rights in 
the area that would be flooded.9 It considered many forms of 
right, but its most important recommendations were that, in 
the public sector, roads and public buildings such as schools 
should be replaced, and, in the private sector, cash compensa-
tion should be payable at the current market rates for land, 
cocoa and other perennial crops, buildings, clay pits and 
private fishing rights. In addition, 20 per cent of the assessed 
value of private buildings should be paid to the owners as a 
'disturbance element'. Compensation for loss of private rights 
13 
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in the area to be inundated was estimated at just over £2 
million,* and the cost of compensation administration at 
£700, ooo.10 
Whereas compensation was a legal obligation, resettlement 
was regarded as a matter of discretion. Three approaches were 
considered.11 The first was for the government to pay what 
was legally due and to accept no further commitments. The 
Commission argued that this was unacceptable, since there 
was a difference between the normal situation of the acquisition 
of rights to demolish a few houses to make way for a public 
amenity and the situation in the flood basin where whole 
communities would be deprived of their villages and of the 
land from which they obtained their livelihood. The second 
approach was to evolve a comprehensive policy, set up a central 
organisation, and re-establish the communities as part of a 
single major operation. In rejecting this course, which it 
admitted appeared attractive, the Commission pointed out its 
disadvantages. With centralised planning, insufficient allowance 
might be made for local differences in customs, housing and 
incomes. Further, the spirit of self-help essential for the creation 
of new communities would almost certainly become one of 
accepting everything offered, and then of asking for more.12 
Such a policy would also be very expensive and perhaps 
impossible entirely to implement. The cost of an official organi-
sation undertaking to replace some 18,000 buildings in scattered 
localities would be much heavier than if the people concerned 
built them themselves, using local methods and standards. 
The Commission therefore recommended a third policy: 
resettlement through self-help, guided by incentives. If the 
inhabitants had to resettle themselves instead of being resettled 
* T h e b r e a k d o w n of the overall possible c o m m i t m e n t for compensat ion for 
private rights in the area to be inundated was: 
L a n d £ 1 , 1 1 3 , 6 8 0 
C o c o a 496,400 
O i l palms a n d coconut trees 210,000 
Private buildings 175.940 
Disturbance element 35.188 
C l a y deposits 6,000 
Fishing rights in creeks 8,000 
T o t a l £2,045,208 
14 
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y the government, it was thought that communal initiative 
ould be retained. At the same time, the Commission re-
jgnised that current costs of building were between two and 
half and three times the assessed market value of buildings, 
nd suggested: 'A further liability to pay compensation in 
aspect of housing, calculated at twice the market value . . . 
hould be accepted as a charge on the Project in order to provide 
fair and equitable treatment.'13 This sum was not a legal 
entitlement to householders but would be used as a fund 
additional to the basic compensation to provide incentives to 
encourage them to move to the most suitable new localities 
and to build to a reasonable standard. Indeed, payments from 
the fund would normally be in the form of housing materials, 
and those householders who did not wish to build new homes 
would not be entitled to payments.14 In addition, the Com-
mission considered that resettlement would be assisted by the 
provision of simple village layouts, plans for houses suitable to 
the resources and habits of the settlers, the loan of block-
making machines, and free technical advice and training in 
house construction, as well as the re-establishment of roads and 
public amenities and an agricultural survey of the areas pro-
posed for resettlement.15 The intention was, however, that the 
people should resettle themselves, refounding their village 
communities, building their own houses, being subject to the 
same administration as other communities, and gaining their 
livelihoods by their own initiative without any radical change 
of the agricultural system. 
In order to appreciate these proposals more fully and to 
understand the subsequent evolution of resettlement policy, it 
is important to examine the Commission's recommendations 
concerning three critical resources: finance, staff, and time. 
In the first place, the Preparatory Commission proposed that 
the cost of the compensation and resettlement exercise should 
be held down to £4 million, of which £3-5 million would be 
charged to the Volta River Project, and £0-5 million charged 
to the Gold Coast government.16 An attempt was made to 
avoid unspecified liabilities or financial commitments that 
might become inflated with time. For instance, recognising 
that the government might in some places have to intervene in 
5 
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order to obtain land suitable for resettlement, the Commission 
proposed that any payments for such land should be met not 
by the programme direct but by deduction from the compensa-
tion for flooded land.17 Similarly, evacuation was not envisaged 
as an expensive, centrally-controlled operation, but as a matter 
for the initiative of individuals, who could make use of the 
element of their compensation that was for disturbance. But des-
pite its care to avoid commitments that might slide into heavier 
expenditure, the Commission left ajar the door that had been 
opened by the pledge that the government would ensure that 
no one was made worse off by the creation of the lake. For the 
Commission concluded its recommendations by saying: 'The 
programme outlined . . . is designed to meet the needs of the 
situation, but it does not, of course, exclude additional measures 
by the Gold Coast Government, either specially devised for 
the inundated area, or adopted as part of general Gold Coast 
policy.'18 The significant point was that, if there were such 
additional expenditure, it would be the government, and not 
the Volta River Project, which would have to meet it.* 
Secondly, the Commission outlined the staffing implications 
of its proposals. For the main tasks connected with compensa-
tion—demarcating the edge of the lake, determining and 
assessing private rights, dealing with valuation disputes, paying 
compensation and auditing—it was estimated that 28 senior 
staff would have to be recruited and would work for periods 
* T h e b r e a k d o w n of the total estimated cost of compensation a n d resettlement 
was: 
R e p l a c e m e n t of publ ic amenities 
Compensat ion for the loss of private 
£ £ 
428,580 
rights 
Administrat ion (compensation) 
2,045,208 
700,000 
T o t a l , compensation 3,173.788 
Resett lement: addit ional commitment 
for private housing 
Resett lement: other measures 
Administrat ion (resettlement) 
351,880 
150,000 
250,000 
T o t a l , resettlement 751,880 
G r a n d T o t a l £3,925,668 
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totalling 62-5 man/years.10 The personnel requirements for 
resettlement would be less, including 1 o senior staff who would 
work for four years, making a total of 40 man/years.20 In addi-
tion, for both compensation and resettlement, many junior 
staff were considered necessary. For the two operations, per-
sonnel emoluments and running expenses together were put at 
£578,500 for compensation and £180,000 for resettlement.21 
In the third place, the Commission estimated the time 
required for the implementation of its proposals and also 
outlined a sequence and phasing of activities. Compensation 
assessment and payment were to precede resettlement so that, 
when the people moved, they would have resources to assist 
them, and so that the entitlements of those who accepted the 
incentives of limited assistance would be known. Before com-
pensation could be paid, it would be necessary to demarcate 
some 2,200 miles of the lake boundary, to establish land and 
other property rights within that boundary, to enumerate and 
value those properties and then to deal with any disputes 
arising.22 In the view of the Commission, a target of appreci-
ably less than three years for the completion of these activities 
would have been unrealistic. For the compensation and resettle-
ment operations as a whole, four years were considered 
necessary, before the start of the year in which the lake began 
to fill. Four years was not, however, the entire period required. 
There would be limited activities required for three years after 
resettlement, and, more significantly for any analysis of sub-
sequent policy, other measures were advocated before the 
four-year period began. These were further surveys—of rights 
in the flood basin, of land rights, and of the availability of 
suitable agricultural land in the areas suggested for resettlement. 
In the view of the Commission, thus, the policy of compensation 
first and resettlement second required a period of more than 
four years before the year in which the lake began to fill.23 
P R E C E D E N T S , P R E S S U R E S A N D D E L A Y S , 1 9 5 6 - 6 2 
The Preparatory Commission's Report was submitted at the 
end of 1955, and the following five years were dominated by the 
problems and uncertainties of obtaining finance for the dam 
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and smelter. During this period, little attention was paid to 
compensation and resettlement, and no further surveys were 
carried out. Experience with resettlement was, however, being 
gained in two schemes elsewhere in Ghana. Both schemes 
proved difficult. The first, at Damongo in the Northern Region, 
was intended to resettle Frafra people from their eroded land, 
but was partially frustrated by their reluctance to leave their 
homes and by the hostility of the receiving community. Govern-
ment assistance was provided in the form of free transport to 
the settlement area, paid employment from the time of arrival 
until the planting season, 12 acres of land for each settler, loan 
of oxen and other incentives, but only limited success was 
achieved. With the second scheme, the resettlement of the 
fishing village of Tema to make way for the new port, the 
problems were more intractable and the experience gained 
more widely perceived. Although it was proposed as early as 
1953 to acquire the land on which the old village of Tema was 
situated and to resettle the population, it was not until the end 
of 1959 that the operation was concluded. The government 
built a new village with a higher standard of housing and 
provided replacement housing on a room for room basis; but, 
in spite of this, there was deep and at times violent opposition 
to the move, deriving partly from political divisions within the 
community, partly from attitudes to graves, fetishes and 
magico-religious traditions, and partly from inappropriate 
initial consultation with the people. The move was eventually 
achieved without bloodshed through a combination of patient 
social welfare work, political opportunism, provision of a high 
standard of replacement housing, and the ultimate sanction of 
the bulldozer, which demolished the old houses. (The Frafra 
and Tema schemes are described in greater detail below, on 
pages 105-8.)24 
The precedents and experience of these two schemes affected 
Volta resettlement policy. Resettlement came to be seen as 
politically difficult, and a combination of official permissiveness 
and substantial inducements appeared necessary for success. 
Moreover, the association of the Tema operation with the 
building of a modern port, and the relative lack of financial 
constraints in planning and carrying it out, established urban 
18 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
standards and an urban style as the norm for resettlement in 
Ghana. Since the Tema evacuees were able to continue fishing 
after the move, the livelihood of the people after resettlement 
did not attract as much attention as it might otherwise have 
done. Another result of the Tema operation was an enhanced 
standing for the Department of Social Welfare and Community 
Development in resettlement matters, since a major part of 
the degree of success achieved could be attributed to it. But most 
important, perhaps, was the effect of the Frafra, and even more 
of the Tema, schemes on official perceptions of the problems to 
be faced with the much larger and widely dispersed Volta 
resettlement and on assessments of the feasibility of the Pre-
paratory Commission's proposals. For self-help resettlement 
with incentives, as tried in the Frafra scheme, had not been 
very successful, whereas the more generous provision of housing 
and amenities at Tema was felt to have made evacuation less 
difficult than it would otherwise have been. 
At first, the Preparatory Commission's proposals were taken 
as a basis for policy, but implementation soon ran into problems. 
It had been recommended that a single organisation should be 
created to handle compensation and resettlement matters, but 
this proved difficult. Following progress in the financial negotia-
tions, a Volta River Project (VRP) secretariat was set up towards 
the end of 1959, and, in 1960, the Administrative Officer who 
had been in charge at Tema was appointed to the secretariat 
to take charge of Volta compensation and resettlement matters. 
But a full organisation within the VRP secretariat could not be 
formed because of the reluctance of departments to surrender 
their personnel, a reluctance accentuated by general staff 
shortages. Only two departmental officers were made fully 
available to the secretariat: in May 1961 a Principal Agricul-
tural Officer was seconded; and in January 1962 the Social 
Welfare Officer who had worked at Tema was released for 
full-time work on Volta resettlement matters. Other depart-
ments maintained more direct control over their staff, which 
made co-ordination over timing and priorities difficult (see 
below, page 38), but which had the potential advantage of 
access to departmental resources. The VRP secretariat was, 
however, placed in a position of having to bargain and persuade 
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departments rather than of being able to exercise direct control. 
Thus, it was not easy to maintain momentum and to ensure 
that preliminary activities—such as demarcating the flood 
boundary and valuing the properties within it, operations 
requiring particular care and precision and therefore not easily 
carried out quickly—went forward with the urgency required. 
Against these difficulties, the resettlement programme had 
the advantage of sharing the high political priority of the Volta 
River Project as a whole. President Nkrumah, then at the 
zenith of his rule, had identified himself closely with the 
project and had taken personal responsibility for it. This meant 
that, without actually having to invoke the President, the 
secretariat nevertheless enjoyed a high status which enhanced 
its position in negotiating for services from government depart-
ments. Moreover, implicit in the priority of the programme 
was an opportunity for legitimate access to resources. This 
strengthened the hand of the secretariat, as government depart-
ments saw a chance to participate in a politically acceptable 
and therefore potentially well-endowed programme; but, at 
the same time, these attitudes were liable to bring considerable 
pressure to raise the costs of resettlement. At several large 
meetings of representatives of government departments called 
by the VRP secretariat during 1961, VRP staff pointed out 
the financial implications of any change in policy and tried to 
hold costs down to the estimated £4 million. But departmental 
officers were not so directly responsible for the expenditure 
that might be incurred, so that for some, among them planners, 
architects, social welfare workers and agriculturalists, resettle-
ment could appear as more of a creative opportunity than the 
usual programme restricted by a more limited departmental 
budget. 
In other ways, too, the human and political environment of 
Ghana under Nkrumah influenced the evolution of resettlement 
policies. The Volta River Authority ( V R A ) * was exceptional 
among para-statal organisations in establishing and retaining 
an honest and effective administration, protected by a degree 
* T h e V o l t a River Authority, which succeeded the V o l t a R i v e r Project sec-
retariat, was set up in December tg6i under the Volta River Development Act, ig6i 
(Act 46, Government Printer, Accra 1961). 
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of insulation from the political interference, corruption and 
inefficiency which were common elsewhere; but, at the same 
time, the staff of the VRP secretariat and later of the VRA were 
in the limelight, and politically exposed, by virtue of the very 
priority and prestige of their work. Nowhere was this more 
so than in the Resettlement Organisation, responsible as it was 
for the politically sensitive and potentially explosive operation 
of moving 80,000 people from their homes and resettling them 
within an inexorable timetable. Any major disaster or powerful 
criticism would be laid at the door of the resettlement staff. 
Moreover, the style of Nkrumah's government was generous 
and modern, if profligate, and civil servants were aware that 
not only they but also Ghana would be judged by the operation 
which they were planning. In addition, it was felt that the 
people in the flood basin were losing their lands and homes for 
the sake of Ghana as a whole, and that therefore it was only 
right that special social welfare measures should be taken for 
their benefit. In all these circumstances, the rather cautious 
proposals of the Preparatory Commission, tenable perhaps for 
a colonial government, appeared inappropriate in independent 
Ghana, where people and politicians expected something better 
than simple resettlement by self-help with incentives. 
This background strengthened the hands of those depart-
mental officers who favoured more extensive measures than 
those originally proposed. Town planners and architects com-
bined professional and patriotic enthusiasm in suggesting that 
the communities should be resettled in modern model villages 
of which the nation could be proud. Physical planners were 
able to argue for a more positive approach to resettlement. One 
plan put it that: 
A tour round the entire periphery of the lake carries one 
from the environment of the twentieth century which may 
be seen at Akosombo back through the environments of 
the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries. The eastern and 
southern fringes are progressing; the northern and western 
areas are just waiting. In these poor traditional areas, cash 
compensation would push back the mud and thatched 
villages, the hand-hoe, malnourishment, disease and poverty 
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—push them back but a few miles further into the savannah. 
Nor would cash compensation advance the economy of the 
eastern and southern fringes as some thirty thousand settlers 
simply wedged into the present farms and villages and simply 
increased density. Cash compensation would not harness the 
great energy of this manpower or the land or water.25 
To take advantage of the opportunity they saw in resettlement, 
some town planners and architects advocated a much more 
comprehensive policy than the mere provision of technical 
advice, some building materials and simple village layouts. 
They recommended instead the introduction of minimum 
building standards, including landcrete* walls and corrugated 
aluminium roofs in place of the mud and thatch of traditional 
houses. They brought vision to policy discussions, and the 
vision was primarily urban, based less on rural life than on the 
experience of towns and of town planning. 
To the Social Welfare Department, too, the resettlement 
operation presented a challenge and an opportunity. Self-help 
was an important tenet of community development. Moreover 
the performance of the department in the resettlement of Tema 
made it seem sensible that it should also play a major part in 
the Volta operation. It also had a Field Technical Unit which 
could assist in house construction. Like the planners and 
architects, Social Welfare staff favoured better housing and 
taking advantage of resettlement to raise the standards of 
living of the people. 
Agriculturalists also saw the resettlement operation as an 
opportunity. The Ministry of Agriculture needed to put forward 
proposals to fulfil its targets in the Seven-Year Development 
Plan, and previous projects had often been unsuccessful. A 
resettling population could, it was thought, be persuaded to 
make a radical change from traditional to modern farming 
methods more easily than one already entrenched on the land. 
At the same time, surveys were showing that there was less 
agricultural land available for the resettling communities than 
had been believed, and that it would be inadequate to sustain 
them by the traditional system of extensive shifting cultivation. 
* A w e a k ( 1 : 1 2 to 1 : i6) m i x of cement a n d m u d . 
22 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Proposals for more intensive, mechanised agriculture with 
co-operative provision of services and marketing were therefore 
put forward and were grafted on to resettlement. The agri-
cultural programme was to be financed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and, by promising higher incomes for the people, 
it could be seen to justify and support the minimum building 
standards favoured by the architects, planners and social 
welfare staff. 
Throughout the meetings of 1961, the VRP secretariat tried 
to reconcile the financial limits set by the Preparatory Com-
mission with the proposals put forward by departments. But, 
little by little, additional commitments were accepted: that a 
subsistence allowance might be paid to the people while they 
were working on their houses; that their labour might be 
supplemented by the Workers' Brigade if necessary; that the 
Builders' Brigade might be employed to clear sites for the new 
settlements; that some minimum building standard should be 
adopted. Vigorous discussion took place between those res-
ponsible for financial control, who considered that the policy 
that no one should be worse off meant that they should be 
only marginally better off, and those who saw resettlement as 
an opportunity to create new communities with a substantially 
higher standard of living and technology. 
The various factors outlined above—the precedents and 
experience of earlier resettlement operations, the political 
environment, departmental pressures—might not of themselves 
have forced a radical reappraisal of policy. But, in the event, 
shortage of time became a decisive and irresistible constraint 
which narrowed the options open and made a new policy 
inevitable. By the end of 1961, dam construction was already 
under way and the lake was expected to begin to form in 
mid-1964, leaving less than three years before the inhabitants 
of the basin would start to be flooded out. Surveys had, it is 
true, been begun, but these had themselves added to the 
problems. Demarcation of the flood boundary had proceeded 
slowly in adverse conditions and had fallen far behind schedule, 
making more difficult the tasks of valuation and social survey. 
Site selection for resettlement was emerging as a knotty issue, 
complicated by survey findings that many sites provisionally 
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recommended by the Preparatory Commission were either on 
poor soils or already extensively farmed. It was even uncertain 
how many people were living in the lake area. The Preparatory 
Commission had put it at 62,500,26 but on the basis of the 
census of 1960 a figure of 50,000 was quoted during 1961, and 
20,000 was even mentioned. 
At the end of 1961, matters were aggravated by the transfer 
of the officer in charge of resettlement. Precious time was lost 
during the first five months of 1962 while an unsuccessful 
attempt was made to recruit a retired expatriate to replace 
him. When, in May 1962, a senior member of VRA staff was 
appointed Resettlement Officer, little more than two years 
remained before the flood, as against the period of over four 
years considered necessary by the Preparatory Commission. 
Given the uncertain information available, the wide scatter of 
communities, the poor communications in the lake basin, the 
emerging problems of site selection, the shortages of staff, and 
above all the inexorable deadline for dam-completion, it was 
difficult to see how resettlement could be carried out at all 
without human disaster. Ghana faced what amounted to a 
national emergency. The time factor alone ruled out any 
possibility of following the Preparatory Commission's proposal 
for payment of compensation before resettlement. The Resettle-
ment Officer and those committed to the operation faced a 
daunting and complex challenge. The crisis demanded a new 
policy followed by urgent action, but in mid-1962 that new 
policy had yet to be worked out. 
F O R M U L A T I N G A N E W P O L I C Y , 1 9 6 1 - 6 3 
One of the first acts of the Resettlement Officer was to form a 
Working Party of key officers (for a description of this Working 
Party, see below, pages 36-9). Although the VRA Board, chaired 
by President Nkrumah, was the ultimate authority, and the 
Chief Executive of the VRA included resettlement matters 
among his many responsibilities, it was this Working Party, 
meeting fortnightly, which became the main centre of policy 
discussions. The Resettlement Officer, as chairman, wrote the 
minutes and circulated them widely to principal secretaries. 
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departmental heads and district commissioners. From these 
minutes, it is possible to trace how in 1962 and 1963 a new 
policy was devised to meet the crisis. For the purposes of 
analysis and description, three interwoven threads can be 
separated out: first, housing and self-help; second, the size of 
the resettlements; and third, compensation. 
The first thread concerns housing and self-help. The Pre-
paratory Commission had recommended that 'the Gold Coast 
Government should not accept any responsibility for any actual 
construction'27 and had proposed that, through a community 
spirit of self-help and selective incentives, the people should be 
encouraged to build 'new dwellings of adequate though modest 
standards'28 for themselves. It was not a long step from this 
position to the minimum housing standards put forward in 
the meetings of 1961, but still at that stage regarded as optional. 
However, when the minimum housing standards were costed, 
they were found to require over £6 million, over half as much 
again as the total budget. 
The proposals for minimum housing standards placed the 
Department of Social Welfare in a dilemma: it favoured self-
help, communal effort and improved standards of living, but 
the planners and architects argued that the houses required 
could not be built in the time by self-help and that contractors 
and direct labour would have to be used. For a time, the 
Department of Social Welfare assumed that communal labour 
coupled with technical assistance from its Field Technical Unit 
would be adequate. The department supported the adoption 
of different housing types to fit the traditions and needs of the 
different communities affected, particularly in the north where 
it was expected that many people would want to continue to 
live in round huts surrounding a compound. This suggestion 
was, however, attacked by a government minister from the 
north who insisted that northerners should not be fobbed off 
with what he feared might be second-best housing, but should 
receive exactly the same treatment as people in the south. 
Meanwhile, experience at the first resettlement site, Nkwaku-
bew, suggested that communal labour was difficult to organise 
and slow in achievement, and that a high-powered centralised 
organisation would be needed if sufficient housing was to be 
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built before the lake filled. Such an organisation, working 
against tight deadlines, would itself be driven to favour uni-
formity in construction, in order to simplify its tasks of supply 
and building. Faced with these political and practical pressures 
for standardisation, and appreciating the scale and urgency 
of the challenge, the Department of Social Welfare came to 
accept that its original proposals could not be sustained; direct 
labour would have to be used and uniform housing designs 
adopted. 
Attempts were made, however, to retain some self-help. At 
one small site, Todome, where the inhabitants of the lower 
half of a village on a steep slope were resettling nearby, new 
homes were eventually completed by self-help, but only after a 
prolonged effort and with considerable strain on the resources 
of the regional organisation of the Department of Social 
Welfare and Community Development, which had responsi-
bility for organising the self-help programme. Elsewhere, it 
was intended that communal labour should be used for the 
construction of streets, street drains, schools, community centres, 
post offices and markets. In practice, however, communal 
labour was difficult to mobilise and even more difficult to 
sustain. At Kete Krachi, it was only after a special visit by a 
minister that some clearing could be started; and the work 
stopped almost immediately with the onset of Ramadan, when 
the Muslims pointed out that they could scarcely carry out 
heavy work while fasting all day. The main attempt to retain 
some self-help was, however, through an ingenious innovation 
-—the core or nuclear house which was to be built on the 
resettlement sites. Direct labour was to be used to construct a 
landcrete house with a corrugated aluminium roof and cement 
floor large enough for two rooms and two verandahs, but the 
walls of only one room were to be completed, leaving the 
remaining walls to be added on later by the settler and his 
family. Every family which opted for official resettlement was 
to have a core house and would thus be provided with im-
mediate shelter; a higher standard of housing would be 
achieved; and the principle of self-help would not be aban-
doned, only postponed in its application. 
The second thread of policy concerned who should be 
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resettled and the size of resettlement units. The Preparatory 
Commission thought in terms of re-founding village com-
munities, but foresaw one town (Kete Krachi) and fifty villages 
of between 200 and 1,200 inhabitants. Of the estimated 62,500 
people in the lake basin at the end of 1954, it was thought that 
only 40,000 lived there permanently, with another 10,000 
having dwellings in the area but also homes in other parts of 
the country, and about 12,500 being 'strangers', most notably 
Tongu fishermen and Konkomba farmers, in temporary resi-
dence. The Tongu fishermen would not be eligible for com-
pensation for land ownership or perennial crops, since they 
had neither, and it was thought that strangers might not always 
wish to build new villages but might instead prefer to return 
to their home towns or move to other parts of the country. In 
addition, the Krobo farmers in South Afram who traditionally 
lived on individual homesteads were expected to resettle them-
selves in a similar pattern not entailing nucleated villages. 
Consequently, it was anticipated that a considerable proportion 
of the population would not move to resettlement villages.29 
In the event, however, several factors combined to increase 
the numbers of people for whom the official resettlement 
operation had to cater. The population to be displaced, 
thought to have been 62,500 at the end of 1954, was found to 
be some 80,000 in 1963. There were political pressures on the 
Resettlement Office to include in the programme all the 
inhabitants of the flood basin: two Tongu leaders who were 
government ministers made it known that they expected the 
Tongu fishermen to be given new houses and to receive the 
same treatment as other people. The agriculturalists were 
anxious that the Krobo farmers should be included wherever 
possible, since, being energetic and able farmers, they would 
increase the chances of success for the agricultural programme. 
Administratively, too, in the time and with the staff resources 
available, to have excluded any group of persons from valuation, 
social survey and resettlement would have been difficult and 
open to abuses. All the inhabitants of the flood area were 
therefore included, and all were given the choice of either 
accepting minimum compensation and resettling themselves 
or being resettled in one of the official sites. Many who at first 
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opted to resettle themselves later changed their minds. A 
substantial proportion of the Tongu fishermen altered their 
decisions in favour of official resettlement, after heavy floods in 
1963 (unconnected with the dam) convinced them that the 
bigger flood prophesied by the government really would occur. 
The Social Welfare workers who enumerated, consulted and 
exhorted the people also persuaded many to accept official 
resettlement, being themselves assured that it would bring the 
benefits of modern facilities, better housing, and higher incomes 
through improved agriculture. Resettlement became a crusade 
for social and economic development, and in the end only some 
13 per cent of the population decided to resettle themselves. 
At the same time as the numbers for whom it was realised 
resettlement would have to be organised were increasing, the 
question of the size and number of settlements had to be 
decided. The planners began by thinking in terms of a wide 
range of sizes of settlement, from a central town with a popula-
tion of at least 5,000 down to clusters of individual farmsteads. 
In the interests of improved services, some amalgamations of 
smaller villages were suggested, since communities below a 
certain size could not economically support amenities like 
primary and middle schools, an electricity supply or a neigh-
bourhood centre. In the Volta Basin Area Development Plan, 
the argument was carried further in favour of modernisation of 
human settlement from 'the hundreds of small subsistence 
villages along the water's edge to larger and fewer townships 
with regional markets and industries'.30 As discussions con-
tinued through 1962 and into 1963 this change of emphasis 
was reflected in the disappearance of 'village' from resettlement 
vocabulary, and, after a brief interval when 'sites' were talked 
of, its replacement by 'town'. But more than the drive for 
urban services and modernity, it was the sheer pressure of 
time and the administrative load that forced the adoption of a 
more standardised policy. Site negotiations were complex and 
difficult, requiring several types of survey and much consulta-
tion among and between both departmental officers and local 
groups. It became vital that the number of such operations 
should be limited, and this implied fewer and therefore larger 
resettlements. This had other advantages besides saving time 
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and administration. The agriculturalists were by no means 
opposed to larger settlements since they would provide a 
compact and more easily controlled labour force for their pro-
posed mechanised agriculture with co-operative services. 
Later too, with the construction programme, there were 
powerful arguments for achieving economies of scale through 
fewer, larger, towns. Divided though they were on some other 
issues, all departments were agreed on the convenience of 
grouping into larger residential units, and the Department of 
Social Welfare worked to persuade communities to join to-
gether as a necessary condition for the higher standards of 
living that were anticipated. The outcome was 52 resettlement 
sites with an average planned population of over 1,300 persons 
each. 
The third policy thread was compensation. As we have seen, 
the Preparatory Commission had proposed that compensation 
should precede resettlement. Compensation for land and per-
ennial crops was to be in cash, and for buildings either in cash 
at their current market value or in building materials at three 
times their current market value, in conjunction with the 
resettlement programme. However, assessment of compensation 
emerged as an increasingly complex undertaking as, in equity, 
more and more individual variations were considered. At one 
time, differing rates of compensation for land of differing 
potential were even contemplated. But to be able to compensate 
for land in any detailed way, a full survey would have had to be 
carried out before the lake formed, and this was utterly beyond 
the resources of the Survey Department, already fully extended 
on demarcating the lake boundary. What was attempted had 
to be trimmed to what could be achieved. Thus, the valuation 
teams which started work in May 1961 enumerated rooms, 
buildings and perennial crops, but made no attempt to value 
land. Even so, the valuations and details of buildings were not 
ready in time to be used in the planning of the resettlement 
towns, so that the Tema system of house replacement on a 
room for room basis, proposed for Volta in 1961, would have 
been administratively out of the question, even if it had been 
physically and financially feasible. Indeed, in the short time 
available and with the concentration of attention on the more 
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critical questions of evacuation and resettlement, the only 
course of action open was to obtain as much information as 
possible before the flood, and then assess and pay compensation 
later, unavoidably reversing the order of activities recom-
mended by the Preparatory Commission. 
For compensation to be fair, effective and not too delayed, 
some drastic simplifications were required. Administratively, 
it was fortunate that the Volta River Development Act provided 
that 'compensation may be paid in money or in non-monetary 
assistance towards settlement or both. No person shall be 
entitled to dispute the compensation offered to him by reason 
only that it is not in money, whether in whole or in part.'31 
The cost of construction of a core house was likely to be greater 
than the vast majority of compensation entitlements, making it 
possible to blot them out by treating housing as compensation. 
This, then, became the last thread that tied up resettlement 
policy in its new package. Because house construction by self-
help had to be abandoned and construction by direct labour 
accepted, and because the people were being strongly en-
couraged to accept official resettlement rather than take cash 
compensation and resettle themselves, it seemed that the in-
numerable variations and details of compensation could in 
most cases be smothered and eliminated in the one standardised 
act of presenting each family with a core house. 
Largely because of the construction costs, this new policy 
could be implemented only if more funds were made available. 
The ceiling for resettlement and compensation expenditure was 
raised from the original £4 million to £8-5 million, not 
including the agricultural programme which was separately 
financed. Fortunately, there were savings on the main dam 
project which could be diverted to resettlement to meet this 
additional cost. By the end of 1964, resettlement expenditure 
of £7-7 million had been brought to book, of which £6-o 
million had been on clearing and construction. 
The implementation of the new resettlement policy up until 
March 1965 is described in the papers which follow. It is 
unnecessary to anticipate the story here. But, since the scale 
of what was done is sometimes concealed by the modesty of 
the papers, it is right to emphasise that, by the end of 1964, 
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near ly 2,000 miles o f the lake b o u n d a r y h a d b e e n d e m a r c a t e d , 
n e a r l y 15,000 bui ld ings re ferenced, a c o m p r e h e n s i v e social 
s u r v e y o f some 80,000 p e o p l e e x e c u t e d , o v e r 14,000 acres o f 
l a n d c leared , o v e r 500 miles o f later i te r o a d constructed or 
i m p r o v e d , 52 set t lement sites n e g o t i a t e d a n d p l a n n e d , over 
11,000 core houses bui l t , a n d over 10,000 famil ies o u t o f a n 
est imated 15,000 safely e v a c u a t e d . A l l this, it m u s t b e re-
m e m b e r e d , w a s a c h i e v e d w i t h o u t a n y serious opposi t ion to 
e v a c u a t i o n , w i t h o u t (so far as is k n o w n ) a n y loss o f life, o f ten 
in r e m o t e c o u n t r y w i t h p o o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , d i f f icul t terrain 
a n d thick forest, a n d u n d e r e x t r e m e pressure f r o m s h o r t a g e o f 
t ime. B y a n y s tandards , the c e n t r a l act ivit ies p e r f o r m e d u p to 
t h a t p o i n t w e r e successful, in s o m e respects o u t s t a n d i n g l y so. 
W h a t these activit ies w e r e , h o w t h e y w e r e c a r r i e d out , the 
dif f icult ies e n c o u n t e r e d a n d the lessons l e a r n t f r o m the ex-
per ience are the subject o f the p a p e r s w h i c h f o l l o w , a n d w h i c h 
w e r e presented at the V o l t a R e s e t t l e m e n t S y m p o s i u m held in 
K u m a s i in M a r c h 1965. 
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R O B E R T C H A M B E R S 
Postscript: The Resettlement Programme, ig6j-68 
A P A R T F R O M the Introduction, the papers in this book are 
substantially those presented at the Volta Resettlement Sym-
posium in March 1965. They were written while the experience 
of surveys, site selection, planning, construction and evacuation 
was still vivid. The high point of crisis during the evacuations 
of 1964 had been effectively tackled and a satisfaction at the 
achievement was thoroughly justified. Despite the desperate 
shortage of time (aggravated by closure of the dam ahead of 
schedule), bad communications, the scattered population and 
the multiple difficulties of building new towns, the main tasks 
had been successfully completed. Evacuation had been carried 
out with a high degree of co-operation from the people. Per-
manent shelter had been provided for them. Roads, schools 
and water supplies had been constructed in order to enable 
them to achieve a higher standard of welfare. Food from the 
World Food Program (WFP) was being supplied to the people 
who had been resettled for the first six months until they could 
grow their own food. An outside observer could not fail to be 
impressed by the dedication and skill of those who had imple-
mented the programme, and by its achievements and successes. 
These papers were not written with the benefit of hindsight 
derived from the three years that were to follow, yet already 
they foresaw most of the main problems that were to arise. The 
history of resettled communities is almost always a catalogue 
of problems and responses to them, and in this the Volta 
resettlement towns have been no exception. From 1965 to 1968 
they were beset with difficulties, but these do not amount to 
Note: References for this chapter will be found on pages 268-9. 
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the whole story. The account that follows seeks to describe the 
events and changes in the resettlement programme in a way 
which does justice to the actors and the obstacles which they 
faced, and which may suggest the relevance of the experience 
for other similar programmes. The description can, for con-
venience, be grouped under three headings: first, social welfare 
and the resettlement towns, including compensation and 
housing, all areas in which Social Welfare staff were involved; 
second, agriculture, land and the World Food Program (WFP) ; 
and third, the settlers' experience and reactions. 
S O C I A L W E L F A R E A N D T H E R E S E T T L E M E N T T O W N S 
The Social Welfare staff who had carried out the social survey 
and evacuation stayed on to administer the resettlements. 
While working for the VRA, the senior Community Development 
Assistant (CDA) in each settlement was, after 1964, designated 
Town Manager and paid a higher salary than before in 
recognition of his increased responsibilities. He was usually 
assisted and complemented by a female CDA and, in the larger 
settlements, a second male CDA. At the end of 1965, when the 
VRA intended to withdraw from financial and administrative 
responsibility for the towns, the Town Managers and C D A S 
were transferred to the Department of Social Welfare, and the 
Town Managers lost their higher salaries and reverted to the 
normal CDA scale of remuneration. They were, however, still 
expected to constitute a government presence in the settlements, 
to control housing development, to ensure the maintenance 
of facilities such as water supplies, markets and sanitation, to 
organise refuse collection and dumping, to launch and support 
Town Development Committees, and to act in a general 
co-ordinating role with agricultural and health staff, water 
pump attendants and teachers. 
At first, the C D A S were helped by the standing they had 
earned during the earlier stages of the operation. It was they 
who had warned the people that the flood would come, who 
had paid special attention to the people's wishes in the negotia-
tions for the new sites, and who had brought the people to the 
new towns, allocated the new houses, and issued the WFP food. 
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But after resettlement some of their shortcomings began to tell. 
Many of them were young and not widely-experienced men 
who did not find it easy to handle the pressing problems and 
the lonely and responsible administrative tasks with which they 
were faced. They felt isolated, and in most cases were far from 
Accra, with which their contacts were typically through 
occasional visits of staff and a slow postal system. From time 
to time their future and even their salary payments appeared 
uncertain, which further undermined their confidence. From 
1965 to 1968 they remained in the towns, while their roles and 
authority gradually diminished, shifting from comprehensive 
responsibility for welfare to what was closer to a combination 
of normal social welfare functions and the administration of a 
government housing estate. 
The Resettlement Office and the Social Welfare staff were 
presented with many awkward and untidy problems, all of 
them smaller and less urgent than those created by the rising 
lake in 1964, but all demanding decision and action. As the 
lake continued to rise, though more and more slowly, evacuation 
of the remaining communities had to be carried out. Water 
supplies were inadequate in some settlements, either because 
boreholes were brackish or because surface water supplies were 
only seasonal. Some remote settlements had access roads which 
were difficult to maintain or which were flooded or in danger 
of being flooded by the lake. Then there were occasional 
settlements with too few houses, and others with too many, 
though considering the hectic circumstances in which planning 
had had to be carried out, the fit between supply and demand 
was commendably close. 
Many of the problems which arose concerned compensation. 
The separate data from the valuation survey and the social 
survey were cross-checked, and a reconciliation team was put 
on to the task of investigating discrepancies, thus providing 
a safeguard against any possible errors in assessment. The 
records of the two surveys proved useful in handling the 
numerous claims received alleging that property had not been 
valued, had been valued incorrectly, had been attributed to 
the wrong owner, and so forth. A number of claims arose from 
allegations that the boundary of the lake had been inaccurately 
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surveyed, but on investigation these proved unfounded. The 
process leading to the payment of compensation was lengthy. 
Assessment was carried out by the Lands Department and 
payment by a special section of the Resettlement Office. Most 
compensation entitlements for those who accepted the new 
houses were covered by the estimated average value of new 
cedis (N(3)7oo* for the core house and N (21,200 for the 
completed house together with other amenities which were 
subsequently charged; but, in spite of this, by mid-1968 much 
compensation had still to be paid out. O f the estimated total of 
N0I*5 million for inundated crops and buildings that was to be 
disbursed in addition to the core house element in compensation, 
less than NCo-6 million had been paid out by the end of 1967. 
Claimants impatient for their compensation made the journey 
to Accra to try and obtain payment. However, these difficulties 
were tackled in 1968 through the setting up of a team to move 
round the settlements and make payments on the spot. 
Many of the problems involving Social Welfare staff and 
settlers concerned housing. The settlers realised that they had 
been provided with a high standard of housing, and many 
were particularly pleased to have keys so that for the first time 
they could lock up their homes. But they also experienced and 
complained about inconveniences. They found the new houses 
hotter during the day and colder at night than their traditional 
mud and thatch homes (see graph, page 174). When they made 
a wood fire on the cooking verandah of the P and R type houses, 
the smoke was a nuisance. The honeycombs, designed to allow 
free circulation of air, also let in water when it rained and 
dust when the wind blew. As has already been mentioned 
(page 189), a number of roofs blew off in the storms of February 
1965; this made such a deep impression that even in 1968 
some people left the settlements affected whenever a high wind 
blew. By far the strongest complaint was, however, about the 
inadequacy of the single room provided. It resulted in over-
crowding, and polygamous men found it embarrassing to have 
more than one wife in the same room—they had either to 
split their families or to put up with considerable inconvenience. 
* T h e cedi w a s created wi th the va lue 2-4 cedis = £(0)1. A f t e r G h a n a ' s 
devaluat ion in 1967, 2 new cedis ( N 0 2) were equivalent to the former £(0)1. 
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Many of these shortcomings had been recognised and 
anticipated by the planners, architects and policy-makers who, 
constrained by limited resources, had tried to provide the best 
they could in the circumstances. In addition, after resettlement, 
official efforts were made to improve the housing. After some 
of the roofs had blown off, the attachments of roofs to house 
frames were strengthened. More important for the satisfaction 
of settlers, a crash house-completion programme was mounted 
and planned to help settlers complete the core houses up to 
two rooms and two porches. The settlers were provided with 
cement, sand and block-making machines and, under the 
supervision of Social Welfare staff, made the landcrete blocks 
that were required. A skilled team circulated among the 
settlements and, with some unskilled assistance from the settlers, 
began to complete the houses. However, the programme was 
not easy to administer, since continuing financial allocations 
had to be negotiated, import licences for cement obtained and 
cement supplied to the settlements in a sequence that would 
fit in with the movements of the mobile team. Moreover, 
settler absenteeism sometimes made it difficult to ensure that 
blocks were ready on time, that cement, once delivered, did 
not deteriorate, or that all the houses in a settlement town could 
be finished during the visit of the team. Retarded by difficulties 
such as these, the programme was still continuing in 1968. 
In the meantime, the Resettlement Office and the Town 
Managers faced a major dilemma over housing standards and 
controls. The settlers wanted to make themselves at home by 
building what came to be known as 'unauthorised structures'. 
In some towns settlers put .up baths, kitchens, hen coops, 
livestock enclosures and extra rooms not according to the 
architects' plans, often using materials salvaged from their old 
houses. A report in August 1964 on New Ajena highlighted the 
issue. It argued that a solution had to be found to the problems 
of unauthorised structures 'in order to save these modern, 
beautifully planned and designed model townships from de-
generating into disorganised old fashioned settlements or 
slums'.1 There was a considerable debate between those who 
favoured strict controls, as embodied in draft model bye-laws, 
and those who favoured a more laissez-faire approach. A hand-
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book proposed for Town Managers was delayed as a result of 
divergent opinions about the degree of control that should be 
exercised over building, and an intention to provide nine 
planning assistants, one to each of the administrative areas, fell 
through because of difficulties of recruitment and training. 
Town Managers varied in their handling of these testing 
problems. Most of them, aware that they might be judged by 
the tidiness of their towns, tried to prevent or at least limit 
the building of shacks and other 'unplanned' structures. Some 
ordered the demolition of those that had been put up. The 
result was sometimes a bare and barrack-like appearance.* 
Generally, however, Town Managers gave way to the wishes 
of settlers in P and R type houses (which did not include baths) 
and allowed them to use thatch and materials salvaged from 
their previous homes to build traditional open-air enclosures 
for washing. In addition, settlers were commonly not prevented 
from the practice, which became widespread, of blocking the 
honeycombs on the houses with cement. It was in the most 
urban settlements—Kete Krachi and Yeji—that the most 
variation in building occurred, in the latter case giving the 
impression that the settlers had been able to build freely to 
their own satisfaction. Until 1968 the desire of settlers to extend 
their houses using mud and thatch was contained, in the hope 
that additional building could maintain the standard and style 
of the core house. In 1968, however, it was recognised that 
extension in landcrete was beyond the means of the vast 
majority of settlers and instructions were issued that they could 
build on to their houses in mud, providing the roof was of 
corrugated iron and the layout followed a simple plan. 
One of the tasks of Town Managers was to form Town 
Development Committees. There was a wide variety of systems 
of representation and election, with either the District Com-
missioner, Town Manager or chief, or some combination of 
these three, deciding procedure, and members being either 
appointed, or elected in public meeting, or co-opted from the 
* Bareness was most noticeable in the north-west, w h e r e goats ate hedges a n d 
tree seedlings. A p r o g r a m m e was mounted to plant trees a n d hedges, but had to 
be a b a n d o n e d because of cost. Nevertheless, settlers did on their o w n plant sub-
stantial numbers of shade trees. 
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Town Development Committees of the old communities. A 
traditional leader was sometimes made the president. As else-
where in Ghana, the chairman was often the Convention 
People's Party (CPP) chairman, or a chief or headman, while 
the secretary was usually either the Town Manager or the CPP 
secretary. The Committees were meant to organise and supervise 
sanitation and cleanliness through communal labour, to co-
operate with the local authority particularly over tax collection, 
and to provide a focal point for the discussion of local problems. 
They were, in fact, meant to take over some of the Town 
Managers' functions. Since they were predominantly political 
bodies with their members drawn mainly from the CPP, it is not 
surprising that, after the coup of February 1966 and the dis-
bandment and public discrediting of the CPP, most of them 
lapsed and were not immediately replaced. Social Welfare 
staff had originally been influential in seeing that the Com-
mittees met, but by 1968 they no longer automatically attended 
meetings, which were anyway less regular than before. 
At the end of 1965, the VRA attempted to withdraw from 
financial and administrative commitments to the resettlements. 
Social Welfare staff were transferred to the Department of 
Social Welfare. The heavy equipment that was being used to 
clear land for agriculture was sold off. Road maintenance was 
handed over to the Ghana National Construction Corporation. 
Sanitary and water services were devolved to local authorities. 
At the same time, settlers paid half and then, later, full local 
authority rates. However, difficulties were experienced in 
handing over responsibility for services—as they have been 
with many other settlement schemes—with the VRA as the 
parent agency anxious that standards should be maintained, 
and the receiving authority sometimes lacking the financial 
allocations or staff necessary and anyway resenting the costs 
of providing higher standards of service for the settlers than for 
other communities. Nevertheless, from the beginning of 1966 
pump attendants and conservancy staff were employed by local 
authorities and sanitation and water supplies ceased to be such 
a direct concern of the Social Welfare staff, although they 
were expected to intervene where a service was badly neglected. 
Meanwhile, the Resettlement Officer and the VRA retained 
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oversight of the settlement towns and continued to co-ordinate 
work and act as a clearing house for problems, besides handling 
the records of the settlements, compensation claims and pay-
ments and administrative aspects of the house-completion 
programme. 
In the settlement towns, with the ending of the WFP food 
issues, the decline of Town Development Committees, the 
handing over of maintenance responsibilities for services and 
the slowing pace of house completion, the intended functions 
of the CDAS shifted towards more usual social welfare roles such 
as adult education, care of the blind and the imparting of 
domestic skills to the women. They were also expected to 
continue to try to help the various communities to adjust to one 
another. But, with time, the main attention of the resettlement 
programme moved from welfare to economy. For, as several 
of the contributors of symposium papers pointed out, it was 
the agricultural programme on which the ultimate viability of 
the settlements depended. 
A G R I C U L T U R E , L A N D A N D T H E W O R L D F O O D 
P R O G R A M 
The programme for intensive agriculture based on the resettle-
ment towns was adopted for several reasons. It was expected to 
make it possible for the settlers to achieve a higher standard of 
living. Since the land available at the resettlement sites was too 
small to allow settlers to continue extensive shifting cultivation, 
a more intensive system seemed essential. The Ministry of 
Agriculture was also enthusiastic about the possibilities of 
mechanised agriculture with farmer co-operatives for the supply 
of inputs and for marketing. The VRA readily accepted the 
programme, since it was to be financed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and since it promised a level of incomes which 
would improve the lot of the people and enable the resettlement 
towns to become economically viable as communities. Agricul-
ture was, indeed, the essential foundation for the long-term 
success of many of the social aspects of the resettlement pro-
gramme. 
From the beginning, the agricultural programme was beset 
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with difficulties. At first, by far the most damaging was the 
way in which it fell behind schedule. Clearing forest and bush 
was seriously delayed. In 1962 a directive from the cabinet 
ordered that the supervision and use of all heavy equipment 
should be transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to 
the United Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council ( U G F C C ) , a 
largely political body with very limited agricultural or admini-
strative competence. Despite repeated requests from the VRA 
for machinery and promises from the U G F C C that it would be 
supplied, none ever materialised. When the VRA was eventually 
forced to order its own machinery, valuable time had been lost. 
On top of this, obtaining import licences, negotiating suppliers' 
credits and ordering through the government supply com-
mission further delayed the programme. When priority was 
necessarily given to clearing for roads and town sites to enable 
construction to go ahead, agricultural clearing was even further 
held up. By the end of 1964, instead of the hoped for 54,000 
acres, only some 8,000 acres had been cleared for agriculture. 
By the end of 1965, to be sure, this figure had risen to 15,000 
acres, but at that time the VRA, anxious to avoid further 
expenditure, sold off the heavy clearing equipment and clearing 
virtually ceased.2 
Even if adequate land had been cleared, mechanical cultiva-
tion would not have been possible immediately on the great 
majority of sites. Some tractors ordered in February 1963 did 
not arrive until October 1965. In addition, staff training was a 
major task which took time. This was undertaken on a planned 
and phased basis, but it was only after some of the 400 Massey 
Ferguson tractors and ancillary equipment3 had arrived that 
the training of tractor operators could begin. There was a 
shortage of agricultural staff experienced with mechanisation, 
and some were sent abroad for training as part of the equip-
ment purchase arrangements. It was only gradually that Agri-
cultural Assistants, usually young men with ten years' education 
and three years' subsequent agricultural training, were posted 
to the settlements to take responsibility for the tractor fleets, the 
growing agricultural staff and the cultivation programme. 
To have stood a reasonable chance of inducting the settlers 
into the entirely new agricultural system, it would have been 
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an advantage to have had ready on their arrival cleared land, 
mechanical equipment and adequately trained staff. Only 
rarely were any of these conditions met. Most settlers arrived 
to find that, instead of the higher standard of living they had 
been promised, there was not even any cleared land for them 
to cultivate. They were, it is true, well provided with food from 
the WFP and with instructions on how to prepare and eat it, 
but with few exceptions the agricultural programme failed to 
provide them with the intended independent means of sub-
sistence. Some continued to cultivate their old lands where these 
had not yet been flooded. Others negotiated with local land-
owners and, usually for the payment of a fee, obtained cultivation 
rights and continued their traditional shifting agriculture. Yet 
others obtained casual jobs in the surrounding areas. A few lucky 
settlers were very heavily subsidised in pig and poultry produc-
tion at three settlements (Mpakadan, Nkwakubew, Todome) 
and obtained substantial incomes for as long as the livestock 
schemes were maintained. A few, too, were able to cultivate 
tobacco, and some of these received sums which encouraged 
them to continue. However, a majority of settlers did not benefit 
from the official agricultural programme, and some, particularly 
Tongu fishermen and Krobo farmers, while accepting resettle-
ment houses, maintained their livelihoods elsewhere by adapting 
their previous economic systems to the new situation. 
When the tractors had arrived and the operators had been 
trained, other factors compounded the difficulties of introducing 
the proposed system of co-operatives and mechanisation for 
arable farming. For farmers in Ghana the word 'co-operative' 
had come to be associated with the U G F C C , which was virtually 
a wing of the CPP, and with exploitation of farmers by petty 
party officials.4 On the Volta resettlements farmers regarded 
co-operative organisation not as voluntary but as a scheme 
imposed by authority and inferior to their traditional practices. 
In any case, junior agricultural staff did not have a very clear 
idea of co-operative organisation, and few co-operatives were 
in fact launched. Where they were, they were not necessarily 
pioneering ventures on the part of settlers: at Senchi, for 
instance, the formation of a settlement sugar co-operative was 
in hand only after neighbouring farmers had already started 
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one; while in Yeji an Agricultural Assistant had to use some of 
the more enterprising host farmers to persuade the more con-
servative settlers to join in the creation of a rice co-operative. 
By mid-1968, no co-operative had been registered, though a 
few were in the process of becoming registered. 
Many other obstacles impeded settler participation in 
mechanised farming. Fearing reliance on one mechanised crop, 
settlers gave priority to their separate food crop production. 
Absenteeism made the co-ordination of mechanisation difficult. 
Settlers sometimes neglected to perform a vital activity, such 
as curing tobacco, forcing the agricultural staff to choose 
between carrying it out by direct labour or losing the crop. 
Maize, groundnuts, tobacco, cassava and rice were the crops 
recorded as most commonly grown, but even in 1967 yields 
were not officially known, the reason given being that the 
settlers were secretive and harvested when agricultural staff 
were not present. Until 1968, tractor services were provided 
entirely free, but when charges were introduced most of those 
settlers who had previously accepted mechanisation opted out. 
One result was that in some places, despite a shortage of 
cultivable land, the areas cleared and previously mechanised 
were no longer cultivated and began to revert to bush. The 
agricultural staff were left doing very little. 
As so often with mechanised cultivation schemes operated by 
governments, weaknesses appeared in the control of tractor 
operation, in maintenance and in the supply of spare parts. 
With the Volta agricultural programme these problems were 
exacerbated by the dispersal of the settlements and difficult 
communications. Although there had often been little work for 
the tractors, by mid-1968 about one third were unserviceable. 
The records kept did not permit any per hour or per acre 
costings and there seemed no good reason to disbelieve the 
view that it had been common for tractors to be used for private 
purposes, whether agricultural or recreational. Although there 
had been no economic evaluation of the mechanical cultivation 
programme, it would have been difficult to argue that economi-
cally it had been anything but a disaster up to that time (but 
see page 245 for a discussion of the extent to which an economic 
evaluation is appropriate). 
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Economically, the livestock programmes fared no better. 
Pig rearing was introduced at Mpakadan and Nkwakubew, 
and broiler fowls at Nkwakubew and Todome. A bold start 
was made to these schemes. In the last quarter of 1964, the 
stock of sows and gilts was 520, 100 hogs were marketed, and 
no less than 100,000 broiler chicks were received by air from 
Holland. But soon both pigs and broilers ran into trouble. 
From 1964 onwards there were losses from diseases, but the 
most serious problem was the rapid rise in the price of local 
feed. Severe cuts of imports in 1964-66 resulted in much 
greater demand for local foodstuffs, and the price of maize, 
which was part of the feed for the livestock schemes, rose to 
twice and sometimes even four times the pre-1964 price. The 
hope that mechanised cultivation in the settlements would 
produce the necessary basic food ingredient was not realised 
because of the delays and inadequacies of that programme. In 
these circumstances the livestock schemes were uneconomic. The 
poultry scheme at Todome ceased to receive chicks in October 
1965. The schemes at Mpakadan and Nkwakubew continued 
but in a heavily-subsidised form, with supply of young live-
stock, supervision of husbandry, veterinary services and market-
ing all provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, and with the 
settlers' activities limited to feeding the animals and collecting 
the returns from sale after the deduction of some costs. In 
mid-1968 there did not seem any immediate chance of either 
the pig or the poultry scheme becoming viable in any normal 
economic sense. 
In 1966, the already almost insuperable difficulties of the 
agricultural programme were yet further aggravated by loss 
of access to land. Under the Nkrumah regime, protest was 
imprudent and landholders had acquiesced in the claims to 
their land made by and on behalf of the resettling communities. 
But after the military coup of February 1966 and the establish-
ment of a National Liberation Council, a freer atmosphere 
prevailed, and they felt able to assert their rights, sometimes 
using force to drive settlers off the land they had begun to 
cultivate. This was not serious in the north, the north-west or 
the Afram Plains, where there was plenty of land, usually within 
the jurisdiction of the settlers' own chief so that access was 
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easy. It was in the more densely-populated and cultivated 
south and south-east that the problem was acute. The National 
Liberation Council agreed that the land must be acquired 
legally and the slow and cumbersome procedures necessary 
began to be set in motion. But the surveyors, whose work was / 
considered necessary before land could be gazetted for acquisi-
tion, were often themselves chased off by the owners, with the 
result that in 1968 senior agricultural staff were busily com-
mitted to the essentially political tasks of explanation and 
pacification to obtain agreement for the surveys, and agri-
cultural development was even further delayed. 
In 1966, as it came to be recognised that the mechanised 
programme could not provide a livelihood for most of the 
settlers in the foreseeable future, a more modest objective of 
clearing a subsistence plot for each settler family was con-
sidered. Towards this end an application was made to the 
World Food Program (WFP) in April 1966 for food aid to feed 
settlers while they hand-cleared land for subsequent food 
cultivation. This was discussed by the Tenth Session of the 
Intergovernmental Committee of the WFP in October 1966, as 
a result of which a four-man mission, headed by Professor 
Wilbrandt of Gottingen University, visited Ghana for three 
weeks in February and March 1967 in order to appraise the 
request and make recommendations. Following the Report of 
the Wilbrandt mission, a further modified request was sent to 
the WFP in June, and a plan of operation between the Ghana 
government and the WFP was finally signed in December 1967. 
The intention of the programme, designated WFP 356, was 
to make it possible for settler and host farmer male adults over 
the age of seventeen to hand-clear subsistence plots of between 
two and four acres each. Some 35,000 men were to clear a total 
of approximately 105,000 acres. While working, they would 
be remunerated in food provided by the WFP and in cash by 
the Ghana government at not less than half the prevailing wage 
rates. Over a period of three years and three months, the WFP 
was to supply food aid to the value of §(us)3"3 million.* For 
its part, the Ghana government, through the VRA as its executing 
agency, was to provide an estimated $(us)2-8 million to cover, 
* Figures h a v e been rounded to the nearest $(us)o-i mil l ion. 
2 3 8 
27- T h e a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o g r a m m e . T r a c t o r d r i v e r s b e i n g t r a i n e d as 
p a r t o f the a g r e e m e n t for the p u r c h a s e o f 400 t r a c t o r s a n d a n c i l l a r y 
e q u i p m e n t . 
28. T e n d i n g t o b a c c o p lants . 
29. T r a c t o r s s t a n d i n g at M p a k a d a n . ( T h e fa i lure of (lie p r o g r a m m e of 
m e c h a n i s e d a g r i c u l t u r e is discussed on p a g e s 2 3 3 - 4 0 . ) 
30. S p o n t a n e o u s s e t t l e m e n t b y T o n g u f i s h e r m e n in 1965 at the p o i n t w h e r e 
the m a i n r o a d to K e t e K r a c h i h a d b e e n cut b y the lake . M a n y fishermen 
a c c e p t e d r e s e t t l e m e n t houses b u t c o n t i n u e d to m i g r a t e , e x p l o i t i n g the 
r a p i d l y m u l t i p l y i n g fish p o p u l a t i o n o f the l a k e , a n d se l l ing their c a t c h e s to 
t raders f r o m A c c r a , K u m a s i a n d e l s e w h e r e . 
P O S T S C R I P T A N D D I S C U S S I O N 
among other costs, handling and distributing the food, paying 
the cash wages and obtaining hand tools. 
Much thought and effort went into working out and adapting 
the programme and the agreement. The WFP stipulated that, 
before the programme began, the land to be cleared must first 
be legally acquired. The V R A ' S agricultural staff worked out 
systems for the administration of the programme and for land 
tenure. The government was to acquire the land outright and 
then issue renewable 33-year leases to the settlers and host 
farmers who took part and who would thus become tenants. 
Draft rules provided for the payment of peppercorn rents, 
inheritance without subdivisions and ejection for persistent 
refusal to apply recommended husbandry practices. Although 
the plots were to be for subsistence food crops, agricultural 
staff were to maintain some surveillance of cultivation. A 
socio-economic survey of the settlements, recommended by the 
Wilbrandt mission, was started in October 1967.* As a result 
of recommendations stemming from this research, the cash 
component was later removed from WFP 356. The project 
agreement was altered so that food was to be given as an 
incentive or reward for work done on a voluntary basis. Instead 
of being issued with food and wages on a daily basis, settlers 
were to be allocated their plots which they were to clear 
themselves, rations being given to them according to the number 
of man/days required to clear an area by traditional methods. 
In addition, in order that settlers should have some capital for 
farming, the compensation policy was altered. Instead of off-
setting the value of flooded houses and crops against the value 
of the new houses, cash was to be paid for crops flooded and the 
new house was to be considered as a replacement for the one 
flooded. 
In conjunction with the moves towards implementation of 
WFP 356, the Resettlement Agricultural Unit was, in November 
1967, transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the VRA. 
At the same time, the VRA accepted accounting responsibility 
* T h e survey, with settlement CDAS as enumerators, was directed by D . A . P. 
Butcher as part of the V o l t a Lake Research Project of the United Nations Develop-
ment Program Special Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations. 
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for the programme, and a very senior Ghanaian agriculturalist, 
formerly Principal Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
was appointed to head the organisation. Reforms were quickly 
introduced. Eighty of the idle tractors and operators were 
transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. Charges for tractor 
services were for the first time announced. A determined 
attempt was made to press ahead with acquiring land. But the 
difficulties were such that, by mid-1968, there was no immediate 
prospect of WFP 356 being able to proceed on any scale. Mean-
while, the large bureaucracy of the Agricultural Unit (number-
ing 1,331 staff at the end of 1967) was largely immobile, usually 
lacking settler participation where there was land and lacking 
land where there might have been settler participation. Nor did 
the agricultural staff on the settlements appear to be exercising 
many striking initiatives to overcome these constraints. The 
legacies of earlier difficulties and demoralisation made retrench-
ment and rehabilitation of the programme a daunting challenge 
which would require exceptional administration, some good luck 
and very substantial resources to overcome. 
S E T T L E R S ' E X P E R I E N C E A N D R E A C T I O N S 
As was recognised in the social survey and in resettlement 
planning, the processes of evacuation, resettlement and forming 
new, larger communities were bound to involve stress. The care 
taken to consult villages about resettlement sites and about 
other villages with which they would like to join, to keep the 
old communities physically intact in the new towns, and to 
give people houses near to their preferred neighbours, must all 
have reduced the shock of the change. In addition, shelter and 
food were assured, and Social Welfare staff tried in many ways 
to ease the transition for the evacuees. But resettlement involved 
elements which although intended to be for the benefit of the 
people were, at least in the short run, bound to have an un-
settling effect. The uncertainty about relationships with the 
other groups in the new town and with the hosts; the in-
convenience of the single room of the core house; the un-
familiar separateness and spacing of the houses; the newness 
of the arrangements for sanitation, schooling for children and 
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water supply; the strangeness of the food; and most of all the 
lack of means of independent subsistence through traditional 
agriculture—all these could hardly fail to add to the dis-
turbance of losing a familiar environment and livelihood. 
Bringing small communities together into larger units was 
recognised as likely to create conflicts. Without the earlier 
patient negotiation over grouping and site selection, these 
conflicts could have been much more acute. As it was, problems 
of allegiance and precedence between chiefs and headmen in 
the new towns were often difficult to resolve. The tension 
between the two chiefs at Mpam (New Mpamu) described by 
Martha Dodoo (page 201) continued unabated into 1968, 
and for a year and a half prevented the installation of a postal 
agency in the settlement because of a dispute between the two 
communities over its siting. Elsewhere conflict within resettle-
ment towns was not often as intense; but, in the absence of 
sociological studies in depth, it is impossible to say with any 
certainty to what extent the separate communities had inte-
grated. One possible indicator of social cohesion was the 
number of gong-gong beaters (town criers). Each headman of 
a village normally had one gong-gong beater who made public 
announcements, and many of these continued in the new 
settlements. In Danyigba in 1965 there were said to be eight 
gong-gong beaters, but in 1968 only five, suggesting, by this 
measure at least, that some integration might have taken place 
in the interval. 
As within a resettlement town, so between the inhabitants 
of the town and the host communities, there were various 
relationships and tensions. As would be expected, where the 
settlers and the host community were of the same ethnic 
group and owed allegiance to the same chief, integration and 
co-operation were relatively close. Where a small town or 
village was partly flooded and resettlement was a leapfrog 
operation (Yeji, Kete Krachi, Todome), politico-ethnic pro-
blems were also relatively slight, and previous forms of 
organisation could persist, with a joint Town Development 
Committee and joint communal labour. Where a resettlement 
was grafted on to an existing village, a joint Town Develop-
ment Committee was sometimes formed and joint activities 
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undertaken, but it was more common for formal organisation 
to be separate. Where some facilities were shared, a common 
pattern was that some non-settler children would attend the 
new settlement school, but that settlers would go to the old 
town market. Where the new settlements were isolated, political 
relationships tended to centre on questions of land. In the 
South Afram, where land was scarce, disputes were intense 
and bitter, and the settlements appeared as foreign intrusions 
which the unwilling hosts tried to contain. On the Afram 
Plains and in parts of the north and north-west where land was 
plentiful, the hosts' attitudes were more generous and there 
was less difficulty over access and use. Along the east bank of 
the lake where the resettlements had been implanted in areas 
that were already occupied, the situation was more complex 
and variable. In most places, some negotiations by the settlers 
were necessary before they could cultivate subsistence plots. 
From an early stage, absenteeism was a feature of many 
settlement towns. In some cases, families decamped as a whole; 
in others, wives or a wife were left behind with children who 
continued their education in the settlement school while the 
husband farmed, fished or worked elsewhere. It would be 
misleading to interpret all this absenteeism as an indication of 
failure, since migration, sometimes leaving behind an empty 
house, is a common practice in Ghana and does not necessarily 
imply abandonment. Moreover, there are many combinations 
of reasons why people leave settlement schemes, and simple 
generalisations are almost certain to have limited application. 
All the same, two main clusters of reasons were probably the 
most powerful inducements to leave. 
In the first place, settlers were subject to unfamiliar con-
straints associated with housing administration. Settlers needed 
more rooms, but the house-completion programme encountered 
financial, administrative and supply problems which slowed it 
down, and completion, anyway, left the household with only 
two rooms and two porches. To obtain permission to extend 
beyond that size was difficult, as various plans and application 
forms had to be submitted to Accra; in any case, extension was 
virtually impossible for most settlers, since landcrete blocks 
were expensive and difficult to make and the cement required 
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was often unobtainable. Settlers wanted to build in traditional 
materials—mud and thatch—for virtually no cost except 
labour, but C D A S were cautious in interpreting the regulations; 
in the rare cases where a formal application was made, they 
were inclined to pass it up to higher authority. It was easier to 
refer upwards in the hierarchy and in the meantime to prevent 
extensions than to accept responsibility for allowing them. Nor 
were settlers permitted to sell or rent their houses, although it 
was the long-term intention that they should be allowed to do 
so. In the short term, thus, it was not easy for them to acquire a 
secure sense of ownership and of having struck roots in the new 
towns. Indeed, some gave the impression that they felt they 
were camping on government property rather than permanently 
living in the houses. In these circumstances, temporary or 
permanent migration can be interpreted as, on one level, a 
search for a less restricted environment. The position was 
changed in 1968, however, when it was decided to allow exten-
sions to houses in mud and corrugated iron, but the full effect of 
this new policy would take some time to become evident. 
A second, and probably more decisive, set of reasons for 
absenteeism was the lack of secure livelihood to be obtained near 
the settlement towns and the relatively good opportunities else-
where. Almost invariably, one of two adverse situations 
prevailed: either settlers were short of land, or their partici-
pation in the mechanised agricultural programme was unsatis-
factory and unpredictable. In 1966 and 1967, in the south and 
east, settlers and officials were often driven off the land, so 
that tractors and agricultural staff stood idle and cleared land 
began to revert to bush. But where, in the north, north-west 
and the Afram Plains, access to land was not a problem, 
settlers were able to continue traditional cultivation and were 
hesitant about taking part in the mechanised programme. As 
with similar schemes elsewhere in Africa, their caution was 
probably rational, based upon a perception of high risks and 
uncertain rewards. Settlers could have many fears: that the 
tractors might stop working or be transferred; that mechanical 
cultivation might be untimely; that an unfamiliar cash crop 
might fail or be attacked by disease; that the junior official in 
charge might act in a discriminatory fashion or seek personal 
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advantage through his control of resources; that it might prove 
impossible to handle the labour peaks of weeding or harvesting 
or that these might conflict with the higher priority of food 
crops; that the uncertain charges to be levied for services would 
be high or hard to pay; that land tenure and even ownership 
of the crop were insecure; and that there would probably be 
long delays between harvesting and payout. Granted that some 
at least of these fears were justified, it is not surprising that 
most of those settlers who had a chance to take part in the 
mechanised programme in 1968 decided to abstain. 
In contrast, the economic opportunities outside the settle-
ments were often better. The fish population of the new lake 
multiplied several-fold, feeding on the flooded vegetation, and 
many of the Tongu fishermen, having collected their keys, left 
the settlements in order to exploit this rich opportunity. Other 
Tongu from outside the lake basin migrated to join them on the 
lakeshore. New temporary, and later more permanent, settle-
ments sprang up where old roads cut by the lake gave good 
communications to the markets of Accra, Kumasi and elsewhere. 
By 1968, sited as they were on the edge of the lake, the Tongu 
had also begun to tap the potential of market gardening 
irrigation on the land seasonally exposed by the draw-down 
of the lake. Many Krobo farmers, too, left the settlements, some-
times as at Somanya after first planting their town plots with 
cassava right up to the doors of their houses. As before, they 
formed companies to buy land and continued their traditional 
farming system. In the Pawmpawm area, however, they saw 
the possibilities of the lake and took to fishing. Other settlers 
migrated in search of farmland, particularly from the eastern 
shore of the lake across to the Afram Plains, and from the 
settlements north of Kete Krachi across the Oti arm of the lake 
to land near the new north-south trunk road which gave 
access to the markets of the south (see map, page 50). It 
can be expected that the settlers who moved out of the towns 
were the younger and more energetic, while those who remained 
were the older and more indigent. Such a conclusion is 
supported by the dependent attitudes of many of those who 
remained and who, whenever they encountered an official, 
were more inclined to beg the government for further free 
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assistance to make up for their real or exaggerated sufferings 
than to think in terms of working to help themselves. 
M I D - 1 9 6 8 : T A K I N G S T O C K 
Evaluation of resettlement programmes is complicated by 
three factors in particular. In the first place, there are typically 
multiple objectives and activities in a programme, with a 
corresponding number of criteria against which success or 
failure can be judged. In the case of the Volta programme, the 
purposes up to 1968 had been as diverse as identifying the 
population in the lake basin, constructing resettlement towns, 
moving the people peacefully, creating new communities with 
higher standards of amenity and income and integrating these 
into their new environments. Different aims dominated different 
stages of the operation, and the objectives were achieved to 
different degrees in the various resettlement areas. To select 
one aim, such as agricultural viability, and to proclaim the 
programme a failure up to 1968 would be as distorting as to 
select another, such as peaceful evacuation, and to proclaim 
the programme a remarkable success, true though both these 
judgments appear on their own. 
Second, there are many unknowns in assessing costs and 
benefits. For example, a high cost in financial terms or in 
the use of administrative resources may be more apparent than 
real if more beneficial alternative uses do not exist; and, in 
Nkrumah's Ghana, there was such extensive waste and corrup-
tion that it may well be asked whether, if the resources devoted 
to the Volta resettlement agricultural programme had been 
invested elsewhere—for example, in State Farms—the result 
might not have been even worse. 
Third, evaluations depend upon the time scale adopted. 
With a programme as complex and varied as the Volta resettle-
ments, it is perhaps always too early to pass judgment. A 
settlement town that appears nearly abandoned in 1968 may 
have emerged as a flourishing centre by 1978; and, equally, 
the opposite might occur. Nevertheless, with these qualifications, 
some of the more obvious costs and benefits as they appeared 
in mid-1968 can now be stated. 
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An official estimate of financial costs up to June 30, 1968, is 
given in Table 1, below. Agricultural and non-agricultural 
costs cannot be completely separated, and it must be noted 
that, among the costs incurred by the VRA as opposed to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, some were essentially part of the 
agricultural programme. In terms of orders of magnitude it 
may not be far from the truth to say that the non-agricultural 
aspects of resettlement had cost NC21 million (£10-5 million),* 
and that the agricultural programme had cost N C 5 million 
(£2-5 million), giving a total of the order of NC26 million 
(£13 million). 
T A B L E I 
Estimated Costs of the V o l t a Resettlement Programme to June 30, 
19681 
Itemised Totals 
N(2 N 0 
A. Incurred by VRA 
Housing (including townsite clearing, 
construction overheads and 
equipment) 13,000,000' 
Schools 444,000 
Markets 38,000 
Streets 545,000 
Latrines 423,000 
W a t e r Supplies 386,000 
Roads 3,094,000 
Farmland Clearing 249,000 
Compensation for Crops and Buildings 547,000 
Consulting Engineering 201,000 
Administration (including demarca-
tion surveys, property valuation, 
soil surveys, agricultural expenses, 
costs of evacuation, some WFP local 
costs, planning and general admini-
stration expenses) 2,765,000® 
Total , VRA 21,692,000 21,692,000 
* Most of the expenditure was incurred in Ghanaian pounds, which have been 
converted here at the rate of £ { o ) i = N(22. Conversions to £ sterling are com-
plicated by British and G h a n a i a n devaluations and are here made at the equivalent 
of par before the devaluations. In M a y 1969 the rate was £ 1 sterling = N(2 2-45. 
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Itemised. 
N 0 
Totals 
N ( S 
B. Incurred by Ministry of Agriculture 
Capital and Development 
400 Tractors and Ancillary 
Machinery etc. 
Land Clearing and Farming 
Machinery and Equipment 
Broiler Houses 
Pig Houses 
Tobacco Barns 
WFP Local Costs 
Total Capital and Development 
Recurrent 
including personal emoluments, 
travelling and transport, and 
general expenses 
Total, Ministry of Agriculture 
Grand Total 
2,000,000 
967,000 
177,000 
13,000 
27,000 
9,000 
168,000 
3,361,000 
1,176,000 
4»537.ooo 4,537,000 
26,229,000 
Notes: 
1. S o u r c e : C o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m the C h i e f E x e c u t i v e , VRA, d a t e d M a y 
19. 1969. 
2. C o n s t r u c t i o n o v e r h e a d s a n d e q u i p m e n t w e r e e s t i m a t e d to h a v e cost 
a b o u t N 0 6 m i l l i o n o u t o f this total . 
3. T h i s does not i n c l u d e assistance f r o m the a r m e d forces in the e v a c u a t i o n 
o f 1964. 
4. T h e figure for tractors a n d a n c i l l a r y m a c h i n e r y is a c r u d e r e s t i m a t e 
t h a n the o t h e r c a p i t a l a n d d e v e l o p m e n t f igures. 
T h e r e w e r e also c o m m i t m e n t s for f u t u r e e x p e n d i t u r e . Est imates 
w e r e necessari ly tentat ive , b u t are presented in T a b l e 2, b e l o w . 
T A B L E 2 
Estimates of Orders of Magnitude for Expenditure from July 1, 1968, 
to December 31, 1971 
N0 million 
1. Acquisition of land in the flood basin 1 -o 
2. Acquisition of 438,000 acres of resettlement land i-o 
3. Compensation for crops and buildings (outstanding) 0-95 
4. Government contributions to WFP 356 2-0 
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N(2 million 
5. Recurrent expenditure for resettlement and 
agricultural programmes at N(2o-5 million per 
annum for years 1-75 
6. Cost of completing settlement houses, improving 
township facilities, and payments for additional 
compensation 1 -o 
Tota l N(2 million 7-70 
Notes: 
I t e m s 1 to 4 w e r e est imates b y the VRA. 
I t e m 5 is the w r i t e r ' s es t imate b a s e d on VRA figures for p r e v i o u s r e c u r r e n t 
e x p e n d i t u r e . 
I t e m 6 w a s p u t f o r w a r d s u b s e q u e n t to J u n e 1968 in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h 
p r o p o s e d revisions of p o l i c y a n d w a s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n in M a y 1969. 
It appeared that if WFP 356 was fully implemented and 
completed by the end of 1971 as originally planned, and if the 
V R A ' S estimates were allocated and expended without any 
additions, then the resettlement, compensation and agricultural 
programmes up to the end of 1971 would have cost the VRA 
and the Ghana government a sum of the order of NC34 million, 
the equivalent of between £16 million and £17 million 
sterling.* 
There is little to be gained by setting this figure against the 
£4 million ceiling suggested by the Preparatory Commission 
in 1955. Substantial inflation and the changed objectives of the 
programme make any comparison difficult and unrewarding. 
But any such comparison, certainly up to 1965, does not 
provide grounds for supposing that expenditure on resettlement 
and compensation had been excessive. Rather, when the scale 
of achievement up to that date is taken into account, what 
seems to require explanation is not the extent of expenditure 
but its moderation. 
Other costs were less easy to assess. If shadow prices were 
allocated to imports to allow for the scarcity of foreign exchange 
which affected Ghana during the period under review, costs 
would be higher (all cement supplies and machinery were 
* In view of the imponderables of conversion rates, it would have little meaning 
to give a more precise figure. 
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imported). The resettlement programme had also absorbed 
scarce trained manpower and administrative capacity which 
might otherwise have been deployed elsewhere. There were, 
for instance, two or three C D A S in each settlement, and, by 
the end of 1967, sixty-two Agricultural Assistants had been 
committed to the programme, while in Ghana as a whole 
the ratio of Agricultural Assistants to farmers in 1966 was said 
to have been only 1 to 20,000.5 Another cost was the degree of 
demoralisation and disillusion of both staff and settlers which 
made it more difficult to retrieve the situation. Yet another 
aspect of cost was the deep commitment of the VRA and the 
government to maintaining and rehabilitating the programme. 
On the benefit side, some of the more obvious achievements 
by mid-1968 could be expressed statistically: the demarcation 
of nearly 2,000 miles of lake boundary before the lake filled; 
the reference and valuation of 14,849 buildings, and 46,000 
acres of crops; the social survey covering 78,946 people; the 
clearing for resettlement sites and agriculture of 16,670 acres 
of forest and bush; the negotiation and planning of 52 sites; 
the construction of 12,671 core houses, 81 school blocks con-
taining 404 classrooms, and 46 markets; the installation of 63 
water supplies; the construction or improvement of 512 miles 
of laterite road and 95 miles of streets; and the evacuation of 
12,479 families.6 In addition, over N(2o-5 million of compensa-
tion had been paid out. A Social Welfare presence had been 
maintained in the settlement towns and had worked on com-
munity development, housing administration and the house-
completion programme. A very large number of individual 
problems raised by people affected by the lake had been 
investigated and dealt with.7 An ambitious agricultural 
programme had been launched and a large agricultural staff 
deployed, albeit without proportionate results. There had also 
been some crop and livestock production, though this had been 
very heavily subsidised. 
To these achievements must be added benefits which may 
be no less real for being less tangible. Many children found 
themselves for the first time close to a primary school. It was 
potentially less difficult than before to provide health services 
to the people, and lakeside health and vector control were the 
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responsibility of a special unit of the VRA. Instruction in health, 
home economics and other aspects of social welfare had been 
provided in the settlement towns. In addition, the very dis-
turbance of resettlement, the conflicts of communities, the 
absenteeism, even the disillusion of settlers with the agricultural 
programme could have positive as well as negative aspects, 
and certainly do not lend themselves, given that development 
is full of twists and turns, to any simple assessment. Another 
benefit which cannot be quantified was the experience gained 
by staff who had lived through the resettlement and agricultural 
operations. The Volta dam and the resettlement programme 
has also caught the imagination of Ghana and acted as a 
focus for national aspiration, loyalty and effort. Internationally, 
too, the operation has attracted attention, and the measures 
and experience of Volta could influence programmes elsewhere, 
most immediately that for evacuating and resettling the 
population to be flooded out by the Kainji dam in Northern 
Nigeria. 
Any stock-taking is inseparable from the problems which 
existed in mid-1968 and the proposals for overcoming them. 
The Resettlement Organisation was faced with an intractable 
situation, but without the advantages of the inexorable dead-
line or the sense of national emergency which had obtained 
in May 1962. As before, the physical dispersal of the population 
and the slow communications of the basin aggravated the 
difficulties. But whereas earlier the field staff had been newly 
recruited and could be imbued with enthusiasm, now they 
were dispersed and accustomed to relatively inactive routine. 
The division of the settlements into five districts, each supervised 
by an intermediate level of staff—Assistant Community 
Development Officers in Social Welfare, District Agricultural 
Officers in the Agricultural Unit—could assist only if the 
devolution of authority to those levels was supported by an 
adequate exercise of initiative at them. Moreover, the two 
parallel hierarchies of Social Welfare and Agriculture in-
evitably overlapped. It was also not easy, given the bureaucratic 
imperatives for standardisation, to differentiate policies for the 
very different conditions of individual settlements, although 
such differentiation was proposed through WFP 356. Devolution 
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to local authorities of responsibility for sanitation and water 
supplies had in some cases led to neglect and subsequent 
intervention by the VRA to maintain services. The settlers 
also presented problems. Many had migrated, whether tem-
porarily or permanently, and many of those who remained 
gave an impression of apathy, dependence and suspicion of 
official agricultural proposals. Perhaps most seriously of all, 
at least half the resettlements lacked access to adequate land, 
and no quick legal means of obtaining access was available. 
Consequently, the agricultural programme, in serious straits 
anyway, was largely immobilised. 
It was against this background that attempts were being 
made to complete all housing and to obtain adequate land for 
those resettlements to which it was denied. Proposals were in 
hand to set up regional and district advisory committees to 
assist co-ordination and integration at local levels. Planning 
went ahead for the implementation of WFP 356, intended to 
provide food as an incentive to settlers to clear plots of land 
for their own cultivation. These tasks in aggregate appeared if 
anything more difficult than the original programme of survey, 
planning, construction and evacuation. Far from drawing to a 
close, the Volta resettlement experience showed signs of con-
tinuing in an active manner for several years. 
Concluding Discussion 
For others faced with similar tasks, much of the value of the 
Volta resettlement experience will be at the level of particular 
approaches and measures. Many of these are explicit or 
implicit in the symposium papers and do not need to be 
repeated here. On the positive side, some of the most out-
standing are the social survey, the humane approach to 
moving the people, and the way in which the Working Party 
and specialist staff completed their tasks. But the resettlement 
operation and its aftermath, besides presenting particular 
lessons, also raise issues of strategic importance in planning and 
implementing resettlement and development programmes. 
Those that can be generalised may be applicable to a wider 
range of projects than just resettlement schemes. 
2 5 1 
T H E V O L T A R E S E T T L E M E N T E X P E R I E N C E 
S O C I A L A N D E C O N O M I C P O L I C I E S 
The style of the Volta resettlement operation was strongly 
influenced by the permissiveness and understanding of a social 
welfare approach to development. The peaceful co-operation 
of the evacuation can be attributed to many factors, including 
the people's perception of the authority of the government and 
the inexorable rise of the waters of the lake with which there 
could be no argument; but a major contribution to its success 
was the package of measures—the social survey, the discussions 
about resettlement groupings and sites, the opportunity to 
choose to be resettled or to accept compensation, the provision 
for the propitiation of fetishes and graves, the written warnings 
of the date of evacuation, the care taken to ease the shock of 
moving, the provision of new houses and better services—which 
reflected a concern for the welfare of the people and an 
acceptance of responsibility for their well-being. This approach 
did not cease with the arrival of the evacuees in the new towns. 
It continued in the provision of free food for six months, in the 
house-completion programme, in the maintenance of services 
and in various smaller ways through the presence and activities 
of Social Welfare staff in the settlements. 
The dominance and persistence of a social welfare approach 
affected economic aspects of the programme. Attention was 
focused on the immediate wishes of the people and the measures 
which would most readily and immediately secure their con-
tentment and co-operation. The sequence of concern moved 
from gaining acceptance of the move, to evacuation, to pro-
vision of shelter and food, to community integration and 
welfare. In these circumstances, and given the urgency of the 
operation, longer-term economic considerations received a lower 
priority. Allowing some groups of people to choose sites which 
were unsuitable on technical grounds (such as lack of water or 
lack of agricultural land) achieved a short-term gain in 
co-operation and satisfaction, but usually a long-term cost in 
persisting responsibility for settlements without adequate ser-
vices or resources. Again, compensation in cash had been 
considered, and was indeed an entitlement of those who opted 
to resettle themselves; but for the bulk of the settlers it was 
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feared that the money might be dissipated irresponsibly. For 
those who accepted resettlement, most of the compensation 
for buildings and perennial crops was provided not in capital 
which could be used productively but in fixed, unproductive 
assets in the form of housing. Moreover, for as long as special 
standards of building were required for extending the core 
houses beyond the two-room two-porch stage, settlers' scarce 
working capital was liable to be diverted from directly pro-
ductive use, such as paying seasonal labour or renting land, to 
buying unproductive cement and corrugated iron. The housing 
did satisfy the immediate need for shelter, but at the potential 
cost of future production. 
An alternative that might be considered for other pro-
grammes is compensation in productive assets, such as boats 
and nets for fishermen, and tools, seeds and roads for farmers, 
combined with a simpler form of housing.* In the words of a 
pre-settlement study for another scheme, made in Ghana in 
1966: 'It must be in the wake of an improved economy and 
changed life that a new demand for a different kind of housing 
will arise, and not the other way round. The resettlement 
operation will have been successful if the settlers can meet such 
a demand from their own resources when it arises.'8 With 
higher incomes, settlers can make their own choices about 
subsequent investment—whether in housing, schooling, services, 
consumption or further production. In the long run, it is 
economic success that makes welfare possible, not the other 
way round. 
On most settlement schemes, an earlier humanitarian or 
political rationale gives way over time to economic criteria for 
evaluation. The exceptional persistence of the welfare rationale 
on the Volta resettlements, justified by the failures in agriculture, 
has in turn had the effect of protecting the heavily-subsidised 
and inefficient agricultural programme from economic evalua-
tion. The mechanical cultivation and livestock programmes, 
indefensible by any normal economic criteria, could be justified 
and sustained on the grounds that there were obligations to the 
* T h i s form of compensation was proposed b y the sociologist at the t ime of 
the minor V o l t a floods in 1963, but by that time there was very little room for 
m a n o e u v r e in altering policies. 
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settlers, and the programmes were not intended to be economic 
anyway. The very failure of the agricultural programme, and 
hence the lack of income to the settlers, strengthened the case 
for a persistence of welfare justifications, which in turn com-
pleted the circle by protecting the agricultural programme. 
A central dilemma of the Volta programme, as with other 
centrally-organised resettlement operations, is the effect of 
official action on settler attitudes. Once government has 
touched people, they are never quite the same again. As with 
other welfare-oriented settlement schemes which include the 
provision of services, the settlers on Volta have tended to 
develop dependent and complaining attitudes. Partly these can 
be attributed to lack of work and lack of economic opportunity 
in many of the towns and to the pauperising effects of having 
to rely upon issues of free food. Partly, too, the settlers, sur-
rounded as they were by evidence of the government's munifi-
cence, came to expect to be able to obtain more. Instead of 
becoming energetic farmers and citizens, those settlers who 
remained in the towns tended to become apathetic. Much the 
same has been found on other high-capital welfare schemes 
(Kontagorain Nigeria; the Western Nigerian Farm Settlements, 
where even bad weather is said to have been blamed on the 
government; and the Tanzanian Pilot Village Settlements, 
among others). The settlers quite correctly come to realise 
that they can increase their benefits through petition more 
than production. They play the system. It is not that they are 
inherently dependent, but that they react to the permissive and 
relatively well-endowed environment in which they find them-
selves and demand more, refuse to pay for services and complain 
and agitate, simply because these approaches bring results. 
The chances of avoiding apathy and of achieving secure 
resettlement may be improved if settlers are presented with an 
economic environment which is predictable and workable and 
which they understand. Major innovation, for instance through 
a controlled irrigation system, can be introduced relatively 
successfully providing it is regular in its demands, operation 
and rewards; but to introduce major change—in the Volta 
case through the proposed mechanised agriculture with some 
co-operative services and marketing—is to compound the risks 
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of a resettlement programme as a whole. With simpler resettle-
ment, less can go wrong. With resettlement which is based 
upon the administration of a complex economic system the 
risks are greater and failure leads not only to economic costs 
but also to social costs in the disillusion, suspicion, inactivity 
and temporary or permanent migration of settlers. From the 
point of view of settlers' motivation and performance, it is 
safer to be simple and to allow settlers to re-establish themselves 
in familiar surroundings, if possible building their own houses 
and securing their livelihood in a manner to which they are 
already accustomed. In this way they can more quickly gain a 
sense of being settled, and their labour and effort are mobilised 
without continuing government intervention. The most sure 
way of achieving self-help is to avoid doing for settlers anything 
they can do for themselves. 
O R G A N I S A T I O N , S T A F F I N G A N D S T Y L E 
When it proved impossible to set up a separate organisation 
with its own specialist staff to carry out compensation and 
resettlement, the only course open was to adopt a looser, less 
hierarchical, less predictable arrangment. The Working Party 
set up by the Resettlement Officer in May 1962 appeared 
unsatisfactory because it lacked unity of purpose and cohesion 
(see pages 38-9). But against this must be set the advantages 
of informality. Had it been possible to set up an organisation 
with technical officers responsible to and owing allegiance to 
the VRA, that organisation might have become a miniature 
government with rival counterparts to existing government 
departments. The resulting 'boundary disputes' could have 
delayed the programme. As it was, the looser arrangement 
that was perforce adopted avoided this form of confrontation, 
and placed all the resources of each department potentially 
at the disposal of the Resettlement Officer, providing he could 
persuade the head of the department to release them. Again, 
the departments, working for the VRA on the equivalent of an 
agency basis, carried out their own administration of staff 
and technical work, and the VRA was involved only in the 
planning of the departmental programmes, their co-ordination 
255 
T H E V O L T A R E S E T T L E M E N T E X P E R I E N C E 
with other programmes and the scrutiny and payment of the 
costs submitted by the departments. A further advantage was 
flexibility with staff time, allowing them to start or stop work 
on resettlement matters with a minimum of administration 
by the Resettlement Office. Perhaps most important, however, 
the informal and urgent atmosphere made it easier for many 
difficult decisions to be taken quickly and with a high degree of 
consensus. The potential for disagreement and delay over the 
selection of 52 resettlement sites was enormous, requiring, as it 
did, the co-operation of soils scientists, agriculturalists, social 
welfare staff representing the often changeable wishes of the 
people, geologists, planners and, later, construction staff. That 
these and many other decisions were taken with an easy give 
and take and without individuals or departments taking up 
prepared positions and defending them is of course partly a 
function of the personalities of the people concerned and of the 
urgency of the programme; but even so it is difficult to see how 
else other than through a relatively unstructured meeting like 
the Working Party so many decisions could have been taken so 
quickly and so well. When the sites had been selected and the 
main policies decided, however, the co-ordination of specialists 
and reaching rapid decisions ceased to be the main activities. 
Construction took over as the principal focus of the programme, 
and the Working Party ceased to meet, having completed the 
bulk of the tasks for which it was appropriate. 
It is not easy to assess the extent to which the form and style 
of a programme may be determined by the specialisms of 
those whom it is possible to recruit to assist it. Agriculturalists 
were present at the meetings of 1961 and 1962, and some of the 
administrators were economists by training, but it is interesting 
to speculate whether the agricultural programme might not 
have been different had it been possible, as was intended, to 
bring an agricultural economist in on the discussions. Similarly, 
one may wonder whether the decisions to aggregate the 
population into 52 resettlements, to resettle the Tongu fishermen 
and to build the core house might not have taken a somewhat 
different form had a sociologist, in addition to the Social 
Welfare staff, been present at the meetings in 1961; for, by the 
time a sociologist was involved, policy had already begun to set, 
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These, however, can be no more than speculative questions, 
since policy formulation was subject to so many strong pressures, 
not least the shortage of time. In the event it proved relatively 
easy to recruit town planners and architects, both from the 
Department of Town Planning and from the University of 
Science and Technology, Kumasi, and they were prepared to 
work hard and imaginatively on the programme. As the 
symposium papers show, they made major contributions to 
resettlement. Their presence and enthusiasm shifted the pro-
gramme towards a higher standard of housing and more 
detailed planning of towns, and imprinted the resettlement 
programme with a somewhat more urban style than it might 
otherwise have had. 
Planning, higher standards of housing and the proposed 
agricultural system had secondary effects through the system 
of controls which they encouraged, and indeed seemed to 
require. It must be recognised that, given the limited time and 
resources available, the architects, planners and construction 
teams achieved more than might have been expected. The 
ingenuity of the core house, the skill of the town plans and the 
towns as built all bear testimony to this. But at the same time 
the planning involved in housing, towns and also agriculture 
entailed high costs and a natural pressure towards more and 
more improvements and controls. The original costings for the 
core houses were soon raised. When the first houses were built 
it was intended that the floors should be of rammed earth; but 
some spare cement was found and used and subsequently, after 
the cost had been assessed, cement floors were adopted as the 
norm. Similarly, a cement plaster, not included in the design, 
was added to the walls. But the better the houses, the more 
likely it became that strict controls would be exercised over 
them. Because the core houses were built to a design and made 
of landcrete instead of mud, settlers were discouraged from 
developing and extending them as they wished; because the 
towns had been planned, and paper plans carried authority, 
spontaneous development was hampered, even though the 
original planner might in all likelihood have welcomed and 
encouraged it; and in agriculture, because the programme was 
meant to be mechanised, agricultural staff took little interest 
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in the subsistence production which provided the bulk of the 
incomes of the settlers. Planning and government intervention 
created a power structure which gave authority to junior 
officials who quite understandably exercised much of it in the 
form of controls and prohibitions, and these were often in 
danger of hindering rather than helping social and economic 
development. 
O P P O R T U N I T I E S F O R D E V E L O P M E N T 
Resettlement situations are often regarded as opportunities to 
introduce social and economic changes.9 It is assumed that 
people who for some reason have been uprooted can be 
introduced to new social relationships and forms of economic 
organisation more readily than those who continue to live in a 
traditional environment. Certainly, lacking accustomed sup-
ports as they do and being subject to closer administration than 
usual, they may be in some sense a captive and dependent 
population amenable to a degree of persuasion and direction 
towards a new way of life. Moreover, those responsible for 
resettlement typically feel a proper obligation to improve the 
standards of living of the people involved. 
However, as was recognised in the Volta operation, displace-
ment from a familiar environment is wounding and those 
displaced suffer from stress. They seek to discover in their new 
environments elements with which they are familiar, and in 
this context the Volta policy of retaining communities intact 
and attempting to allocate to families homes close to their 
preferred neighbours must certainly have eased the transition. 
But insofar as people being resettled are faced with unfamiliar 
conditions—in housing, in agriculture, in social and political 
organisation—the stress and insecurity they experience are liable 
I to be greater. There is a conflict here between the aim of 
re-establishment and rehabilitation which, a priori, can be 
expected to be most readily (and cheaply) achieved through 
a transfer to familiar surroundings and a familiar means of 
livelihood, and measures deriving from a responsible sense of 
obligation to recompense people for hardship and disruption 
and to improve their standards of well-being. 
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Opportunities for social and economic development are 
relative in the sense that they can be found almost anywhere, 
providing adequate and suitable resources are applied to them. 
The question that has to be asked is what quantum of resources 
is justified on non-economic grounds, and, for resources addi-
tional to that quantum, whether alternative uses would be more 
beneficial. In practice, a host of factors which are economically 
adverse tend to recur in resettlement programmes: marginal 
land (the better land being already farmed), dispersed settle-
ments with poor communications, crises of staff morale, high 
social overheads, difficulties of devolution of services to local 
authorities, failures of relatively untried agricultural systems, 
dependent attitudes among settlers and absenteeism, among 
others. To differing degrees the Volta resettlement programme 
has had to face all these difficulties and has been driven to 
mobilise additional resources to tackle them. For other pro-
grammes and projects, if pre-investment economic assessments 
do not allow for the probabilities of adverse factors such as 
these applying, over-favourable impressions will be given of the 
opportunities presented. 
Part of the explanation of the frequency with which resettle-
ment operations are regarded as opportunities may lie in the 
attitudes of government and other organisations to projects 
and programmes which have a humanitarian rationale or 
political priority or both. Such projects and programmes often 
combine substantial resources with a degree of protection from 
pre- or indeed post-investment economic evaluation. Moreover, 
resettlement in particular, as with the Volta programme, 
typically involves manageable administrative units which are 
relatively easy to inspect and supervise. They are more readily 
presented as direct evidence of achievement than other more 
diffuse programmes. In different ways the Volta resettlement 
operation illustrates these tendencies: it provided an oppor-
tunity for social welfare workers to change people's attitudes 
and improve their living standards, for architects to design 
housing and amenities, for planners to prepare town layouts, 
for agriculturalists to introduce a new system of agriculture. 
To all of these, resettlement meant a professional challenge 
and a promise of resources to meet it. 
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One aspect of the opportunity of a resettlement programme 
may therefore be availability of resources and administrative 
conditions for the implementation of specialist and depart-
mental programmes which might otherwise not be acceptable. 
Had the original agricultural proposals for Volta not been 
linked with resettlement, with its strong humanitarian rationale 
combined with the need for more intensive farming to provide 
a livelihood off less land than before, they might have been 
exposed to a searching economic and administrative pre-
investment analysis which would have pointed to the probability 
of failure. As it was, the nature of the resettlement programme 
probably made it easier for the Ministry of Agriculture to 
obtain funds for mechanised agriculture with co-operative 
services than it would have been for a programme unrelated to 
resettlement. Thus, from a departmental point of view, one 
criterion of a programme may be the ease with which a Treasury 
or a Ministry of Finance can be persuaded to part with funds. 
From a national point of view, the issue is, of course, whether 
those funds might not be better applied in some other way. It 
is open to question whether, with major humanitarian pro-
grammes which have high priority, the opportunity perceived 
may not often be rather more for departments and organisations 
than for national social and economic development. 
T I M I N G A N D C O S T S 
One of the most important questions raised by the Volta 
resettlement experience concerns the relationship between 
pressure of time and costs. Although the shortage of time for 
most of the policy-reformulation and implementation before 
the flood (little over two years from May 1962 to mid-1964) 
appears extreme, it is common for there to be pressures for 
speed in the early stages of settlement schemes. The lessons of 
Volta in this respect may, therefore, apply widely. 
It has to be recognised that there were substantial advantages 
in the pressure of time. It compelled surveyors to abandon 
inappropriately exact methods of measurement, made the re-
sources of some departments available for what was recognise d 
as likely to be only a short period and not a long-drawn-out 
260 
P O S T S C R I P T A N D D I S C U S S I O N 
commitment, prevented decisions about townsites becoming 
major interdepartmental issues, and gave the Social Welfare 
workers a sense of urgency which they passed on to the people. 
Crisis was a catalyst to communications, facilitating a rapid 
flow of information between the principal officers concerned 
and, for the construction and evacuation operations, driving 
them into setting up radio links between Accra and the field. 
Without the energy, impatience and priority generated by the 
emergency, it would certainly have taken longer to thread 
through the red tape of government regulations for such 
purposes as obtaining import licences for machinery and 
cement. Parkinson's law worked in reverse: tasks were tailored 
to fit the short time available; as those involved worked for 
longer hours, time was in a sense expanded; and they worked 
harder than might normally have been expected of them. 
Consequently, staff" salary overheads were lower in relation to 
output than they would probably have been if work had been 
spread over a longer period. In ways such as these, urgency 
was an asset, saving costs and improving performance. 
On the other hand, the speed of policy-reformulation and 
implementation from 1961 to 1964 led to heavy costs, which 
would probably have been lower had more time been available. 
In the first place, time did not allow a full pilot settlement with 
optimum feed-back to policy-making. The first settlement 
town, Nkwakubew, was an effective pilot to the extent that 
house construction was tried out there, and it was established 
that the Field Technical Unit of the Department of Social 
Welfare would not be able to undertake the construction 
programme as a whole. But as other findings emerged from 
Nkwakubew, concerning for example settlers' expectation of a 
house for each wife and Tongu absenteeism to go fishing, it 
was already late to allow them to influence policies. Again, 
had there been time to test the proposed housing for user 
satisfaction, small adaptations might have been introduced to 
make them more acceptable. 
Secondly, shortage of time was a major, perhaps the principal, 
factor responsible for shortcomings in the co-ordination and 
performance of activities. The sequence of activities was at 
several points telescoped, so that later activities had to be begun 
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before antecedent activities on which they depended had been 
completed: for instance, valuation and social surveys had to be 
undertaken before the demarcation of the lake boundary was 
complete; and planning the settlements had sometimes to be 
carried out before social survey information had been pro-
cessed. More seriously, in the long term, the high priority 
necessarily given to site-selection, construction and evacuation 
meant a lower priority for other activities which were con-
sequently omitted or delayed. In the political climate of 
Nkrumah's Ghana, it was possible to assume that the acquisition 
of land for the resettling communities would not require major 
administrative and legal processing; and, given that time any-
way did not permit legal acquisition, it made administrative 
sense to go ahead without it. In the long term, however, the 
repercussions when the owners of much of the land reasserted 
their rights gravely weakened the agricultural programme and 
threatened the viability of many resettlement towns. Again, 
when activities competed for the same resources, those with 
immediate, short-term and humanitarian purposes took priority 
over those with longer-term, usually economic, implications. 
This, of course, affected the way in which senior officials 
distributed their work loads, but the most damaging example 
that can be readily identified was the clearing programme for 
agriculture. There was straight competition between the con-
struction and agricultural programmes for the use of heavy 
clearing equipment, and clearing townsites for construction 
necessarily and sensibly took priority. Later, however, this 
meant that not enough land had been cleared for agriculture 
and the agricultural programme was delayed and hamstrung. 
In these ways pressure of time contributed to loading the 
resettlement programme with long-term liabilities. 
The difficulty of tackling these liabilities was itself exacer-
bated by a third effect of the urgency of the earlier stages of 
resettlement. The level of performance achieved before and 
during the main evacuation could not possibly be maintained. 
After 1964 there was no longer the advantage of an inexorable 
deadline of dam closure. It was less immediately demanding, 
though in fact at least as difficult, to administer the new towns 
and to promote mechanised agriculture than it had been to 
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carry out construction and evacuation. Communications re-
verted to the standards of slowness to be expected, given the 
physical conditions of the basin. Whereas funds and equipment 
had been available during the emergency, they tended to dry 
up afterwards. The case had to be argued each financial year 
for allocations for the house-completion programme. The 
heavy equipment was sold off, halting the clearing of land for 
agriculture. It was difficult for staff to avoid a degree of 
demoralisation. Had there been less of an emergency earlier, 
there might in the post-resettlement phase have been less of a 
sense of anticlimax. 
If these are the principal benefits and costs of urgency (and 
they are by no means all), it appears on balance that the 
financial costs of resettlement and agriculture in the long term 
would probably have been less had there been less pressure of 
time. But such a statement involves an implied assessment of 
what would have happened had there been more time, and it is 
always possible that this would have meant a more elaborate 
and expensive approach. Certainly, the case for a pilot project 
with settlers and for an ordered sequence for the performance 
of necessary activities is strong, but so is the case for shortcuts 
dictated by shortage of time. What can perhaps be said is that 
the optimum degree of urgency probably lies somewhere be-
tween the Volta situation, where a major activity (land acquisi-
tion) was omitted and another (land clearing) was seriously 
delayed and incomplete, and the Tema situation, where pro-
longed political pressure had time to force the level of amenity 
and service, and hence costs, upwards. But to discuss timing and 
costs in isolation beyond this point without considering other 
factors and how they impinge on decision-making would be 
misleading; for time is only one of the resources involved. 
C O N S T R A I N T S A N D C H O I C E S 
With the benefit of hindsight denied to those who planned and 
executed resettlement and wrote the symposium papers, it is 
possible to see advantages in some alternative measures which 
might well be considered in other resettlement programmes. 
The construction of housing in traditional or at any rate 
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simpler materials might have reduced costs, allowed more 
rooms per family, encouraged settlers to build extra rooms on 
their own initiative, and reduced or removed the need for 
continued housing administration. The provision of compensa-
tion to fishermen and some farmers in economic assets—nets 
and boats, or tools, roads and marketing services—might have 
reduced costs and might at the same time have helped fishermen 
to exploit the increased fish population in the lake and farmers 
to open up new areas to cultivation. A concentration of ad-
ministrative resources on land acquisition and of agricultural 
resources on ensuring that settlers were quickly self-supporting 
for their subsistence needs might have reduced absenteeism, 
limited the growth of dependent attitudes among settlers, 
restrained the growth of agricultural bureaucracy, and avoided 
some of the loss of morale entailed in the failure of the pro-
gramme for mechanical cultivation. All these points are, of 
course, arguable, and actors and observers would wish to 
challenge some or all of them. But whether they are accepted 
or not, they raise the vital and fundamental question, which 
rarely receives the attention it deserves, of to what extent in 
practice choices of policy are effectively open. 
Any short answer to this question is bound to be misleading. 
Many factors are involved. One determinant is the physical 
problem to be tackled. Another is the amount of information 
available on which policies can be based. Yet another is the 
point in time which is taken for the assessment of the feasibility 
of options. But besides these and others, the Volta resettlement 
experience presents a sequence of situations in which five con-
straints, all interrelated, appear to be dominant in setting the 
bounds within which decisions could realistically be made; 
and these may apply widely elsewhere. 
The first is time. There is no need to elaborate the inter-
pretation developed earlier (in the Introduction) that extreme 
pressure of time alone ruled out the self-help with incentives 
policy recommended by the Preparatory Commission. The 
delays of 1961 and of the first five months of 1962 severely 
restricted room for manoeuvre in choosing between policies. 
Drastic simplifications in housing and compensation were 
difficult to avoid. Furthermore, the urgency of the timetable 
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reduced the scope even for identifying what the alternatives 
might be, for instance by making it difficult for specialist 
advice to be assessed with any possibility of rejection. 
The second, closely linked, constraint is administrative 
resources. Given limited personnel and time, the operational 
capacity of resettlement staff was limited. Reduction in numbers 
of decisions, simplification and standardisation were unavoid-
able. The policies of resettling the Tongu fishermen, of reducing 
siting negotiations and decisions by collecting together the 
730-odd communities into fewer larger units, and of standard-
ising housing instead of varying it according to local customs 
and needs, if not dictated by a need to economise in using 
scarce administrative resources, were at least strongly influenced 
by it. Similarly, until the acceptance in 1968 that WFP 356 
would treat settlements as individual cases, the resettlement 
towns, different though they were in size, ethnic composition, 
political relationships with the host communities and avail-
ability of land, tended to be subject to the same controls and 
to receive similar staffing and services. Had other constraints 
remained the same, more administrative resources would have 
been needed to implement a policy of official resettlement 
involving greater differentiation unless, of course, decisions had 
been left to the settlers themselves. 
A third constraint, more elusive but nonetheless important, 
is the political environment. The simplest and cheapest forms 
of resettlement have usually been adopted either under colonial 
governments where civil servants were not subject to political 
pressures or in refugee situations where the settlers are usually 
politically weak. The Volta resettlement programme differed 
from these in that there was a strong sense of obligation to the 
people affected, a sense that they deserved special recompense 
for the loss and disruption inflicted on them for the benefit of 
Ghana as a whole, and in that officials were exposed to the 
likelihood of public criticism by the settlers' articulate rep-
resentatives.10 Moreover, the resettlement programme was the 
more sensitive because of the international attention attracted 
by the Project as a whole, and this may have indirectly influenced 
the tendency to agree that the towns should be modern and 
model. Departmental pressures, too, as we have seen, were 
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for a more expensive programme. In these circumstances, it 
may be doubted whether a simpler form of resettlement could 
have been sustained had its adoption been recommended. 
A fourth constraint is finance. The options considered to be 
open in 1961 were limited by the £4 million ceiling. Later, as 
savings on the dam construction programme became available, 
this constraint was relaxed, allowing the new policy to be 
adopted. In general, with high priority programmes, finance 
may indeed be the resource that is most easily expanded. 
At any point in time, a fifth constraint can also be identified 
in the extent of existing commitment. The government state-
ment that no one would be worse off as a result of the dam was 
heavily committing in eliminating a wide range of policies in 
which some people might have been considered likely to be 
worse off, and pointed the programme in the direction of higher 
expenditure and more lasting involvement. The construction 
of towns, the provision of higher standard housing in permanent 
materials, the services installed in the towns, the 400 tractors 
that were launched on the agricultural programme—these 
were all committing, establishing physical entities on the 
ground, arousing expectations among the people, drawing after 
them an acceptance of responsibility on the part of officials and 
organisations and reducing flexibility for the future. When 
problems were encountered, as most conspicuously with denial 
of access to land, there was consequently a proper sense of 
responsibility to do something about them. But the more was 
done, the more had to be done. To undertake withdrawal of 
special administration of the towns or of the agricultural pro-
gramme would in these circumstances have proved quite as 
difficult a task as any in the whole history of resettlement. 
In other resettlement programmes, and perhaps in develop-
ment projects in general, the extent to which there are choices 
to be made can be expected to be related to these five factors. 
It is not just that different policies make different demands on 
resources, but that the resources available and the commitments 
undertaken close off potential options. As suggested in the 
Introduction, time, administrative resources and the political 
climate combined to eliminate the possibility of self-help re-
settlement with incentives. In fact, without these five conditions 
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— a reasonable time span, adequate administrative capacity, 
political support, sufficient finance and an absence of prior 
commitments—a choice of policy, whatever the appearances, 
may simply not be open. As with the Volta resettlement 
programme in May 1962, there may be very little room for 
manoeuvre. If there is any lesson that stands out from the Volta 
resettlement experience, it is the importance, not just of 
mobilising and being aware of alternatives, but of ensuring 
conditions, particularly enough time, in which there is a choice 
to be made between them. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
It will not be difficult for future visitors to some of the resettle-
ment towns to be critical of aspects of the programme. The ease 
of criticism is, however, partly a function of the free discussion 
and open-handed sharing of information which has charac-
terised the resettlement programme and which has made this 
book possible. It has to be remembered, too, that there would 
have been trenchant criticisms whatever the policies pursued. 
Had the political climate and other factors allowed cheaper, 
simpler resettlement in mud and thatch houses, many voices, 
including no doubt those of visiting experts, would have been 
raised against the wasted opportunity for improvement. Had 
resettlement not been provided for the Tongu fishermen, there 
would have been an outcry against neglect of obligations and 
allegations of discrimination. Any critic will be well advised 
to think back to May 1962 and wonder what he would have 
done had he been Resettlement Officer. He may well be driven 
not to an adverse assessment of what was done but to concluding 
that one of the greatest lessons of the Volta resettlement 
experience is the importance of preventing situations like that 
of May 1962 ever arising in the first place. 
Whatever the future of the towns and of the attempts to 
retrieve something from the agricultural programme, whether 
the towns become flourishing centres or ghost towns, or whether 
as seems more likely their development is mixed and does not 
fit into simple categories of success or failure, the Volta resettle-
ment operation will stand as a brave and imaginative attempt 
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with limited resources to tackle a challenging and urgent 
crisis. It should not be judged only in terms of the multiple 
problems which have assailed the resettlement operation or of 
the failure of the programme of mechanised agriculture. It 
should also be seen as a highly successful operation in which a 
large, poor population, scattered over an extensive and inac-
cessible area, and overtaken by an emergency which destroyed 
their livelihood and threatened their lives, were rescued and 
provided with shelter and food. 
It is well to end with a note of warning. The transfer of 
experience from one environment to another is difficult and 
full of risks. Measures which work in one situation may prove 
useless in another. Politicians, planners and civil servants 
faced with resettlement programmes in other parts of the world 
will want to draw their own conclusions and prescriptions from 
the Volta experience. In doing this, there is one final factor 
which they should bear in mind. Ghana was well-endowed in 
the dedication and energy of those who planned and carried 
out the tasks of evacuation and construction. The Ghanaians 
who prepared the people for the move and then moved them, 
and those—Ghanaians, Canadians and others—who carried 
out the surveys, planning and construction, achieved levels of 
performance which could not easily be duplicated. Such 
service certainly cannot be taken for granted, and any govern-
ment which can call on it is to be counted fortunate. 
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